Unfreedom lies in the structural power to dominate, not in actual interference.

Evidence

What these examples are driving at is that political liberty might best be understood as a sort of structural relationship that exists between persons or groups, rather than as a contingent pattern of outcomes. Whether a master chooses to whip his slave on any given day, we might say, is a contingent outcome: it all depends on the master’s mood, the slave’s behavior, and so forth. What is not contingent (or at least not in the same way) is the broader configuration of laws, institutions, and norms that effectively permit masters to treat their slaves however they please. As the ex-slave Frederick Douglass said of his former condition, “it was slavery—not its mere incidents—that I hated” (1855, 161). — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 16

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to the republican distinction between freedom as non-interference (Berlin-style negative liberty) vs. non-domination; also resonates with the master/slave dialectic readings in political theory. — connects to: Freedom as non-domination is not reducible to security of non-interference. — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 25; Freedom can be reconceived as non-domination rather than non-interference or self-mastery — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 1207; Freedom can be defined through domination rather than through respect for others. — Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 164 (+7 more)
  • APHORISMS: Douglass’s distinction between hating slavery vs. its incidents is a durable lesson about opposing systems rather than symptoms.
  • corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 16

Broader Connections