Domination consists in a power of arbitrary interference, not interference actually exercised.

Evidence

One agent dominates another if and only if they have a certain power over that other, in particular a power of interference on an arbitrary basis (Weber 1978; Connolly 1983). They have sway over the other, in the old phrase, and the sway is arbitrary. It is time now to try to give a more explicit account of what such domination, such arbitrary sway, involves. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 278

The first is that the possession by someone of dominating power over another—in whatever degree—does not require that the person who enjoys such power actually interferes, out of good or bad motives, with the individual who is dominated; it does not require even that the person who enjoys that power is inclined in the slightest measure towards such interference. What constitutes domination is the fact that in some respect the power-bearer has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily, even if they are never going to do so. This fact means that the power-victim acts in the relevant area by the leave, explicit or implicit, of the power-bearer; it means that they live at the mercy of that person, that they are in the position of a dependant or debtor or something of the kind. If there is common knowledge of that implication, as there usually will be, it follows that the power-victim cannot enjoy the psychological status of an equal: they are in a position where fear and deference will be the normal order of the day, not the frankness that goes with intersubjective equality. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 326

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines domination as capacity for arbitrary interference — the master concept of the theory.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 278; Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 326
• XREF: connects to: Freedom as non-domination differs from non-interference by targeting the mere capacity for arbitrary interference. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 434; Domination is a distinct harm even when no interference occurs — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 64; Domination and interference are distinct evils that can occur independently — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 129 (+9 more)

Broader Connections

• Domination requires only the capacity to interfere arbitrarily, not its exercise #corroborates (1.00) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 1217
• Unfreedom lies in the structural power to dominate, not in actual interference. #corroborates (0.95) — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 16
• Non-domination requires security against interference across possible worlds, not mere actual non-interference. #expands (0.90) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 137
• Mere non-interference can coexist with domination when security is absent #expands (0.90) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 349
• Freedom as non-domination is not reducible to security of non-interference. #corroborates (0.85) — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 25
• Freedom can be reconceived as non-domination rather than non-interference or self-mastery #corroborates (0.80) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 1207