Non-interference fails to capture liberty because slaves with lenient masters count as free.

Evidence

Liberals like Berlin have thus understandably rejected the positive and embraced the negative conception of liberty. The question remains, however, whether the received view of negative liberty as non-interference in particular adequately captures the political ideal we should be most interested in. Contemporary civic republicans argue that it does not. … By way of illustration, consider the following scenarios (both are standard examples in the republican tradition). In the first, imagine a group of slaves with a generally well-meaning master. While the latter has an institutionally-protected right to treat his slaves more or less as he pleases (he might start whipping them just for the heck of it, say), let us suppose that this master in particular leaves his slaves for the most part alone. Now to the extent that he does not in fact interfere with his slaves on a day-to-day basis, we are committed to saying— on the non-interference view of liberty—that they enjoy a good measure of freedom. Some find this conclusion deeply counterintuitive: if there is anything to the idea of political liberty, one might think, surely it cannot be found in the condition of slavery! — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 11

Categorization

  • ADDENDUM: The master-slave thought experiment parallels the third article’s treatment of how domination/status relations structure societies — here applied to the conceptual question of whether freedom can coexist with subjection, relevant to institutional versus interpersonal power.
  • corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 11
  • XREF: connects to: Contrasting liberty with slavery reveals a non-domination rather than non-interference theory of freedom. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 170; Freedom as non-domination is not reducible to security of non-interference. — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 25

Broader Connections