The same features enabling trust also enable agent abuse.

Evidence

Yet these very factors that drive principals into agency relationships also offer opportunities for agent abuse (Clark 1985, p. 77). Trusted individual and organizational agents control property they do not own. They have the capacity to create wealth and discretion over the distribution of opportunity. Agents create and disseminate information that cannot be verified by its recipients because of their lack of expertise or access to data sources (Arrow 1985, pp. 38-39). Agents structure futures trans- — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 33

Categorization

• XREF: The double-edge of delegated power echoes the principal-agent problems in DeLillo’s White Noise corporate critique and in Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist on unverifiable expertise. — connects to: The very mechanisms that enable trust also enable its abuse. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 13; The same factors enabling agency relationships create the opportunity for agent abuse. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 33; Mechanisms for controlling impersonal trust themselves create new opportunities for abuse — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 1 (+4 more)

Related

• The same factors enabling agency relationships create the opportunity for agent abuse. (similarity 0.94)
• The very mechanisms that enable trust also enable its abuse. (similarity 0.88)
• Mechanisms for controlling impersonal trust themselves create new opportunities for abuse (similarity 0.88)
• Guardians of trust are themselves positioned to abuse the trust placed in them. (similarity 0.86)
• Trust is structurally vulnerable because agents can exploit principals’ ignorance and distance. (similarity 0.86)
• Controlling trust creates new opportunities for abuse in an inflationary spiral. (similarity 0.85)
• Institutional trust guardians offer advance protection against future agent misconduct. (similarity 0.84)
• Third-party trust guardians create new opportunities for exploitation. (similarity 0.83)
• Trust is structurally precarious because agents control symbolic wealth at a distance from principals. (similarity 0.83)
• Impersonal trust emerges where principals lose direct power to regulate agents. (similarity 0.83)
• Agency relationships multiply because scale creates access barriers to information and property. (similarity 0.82)
• The institutions that police trust are themselves trustees subject to the same agency problems. (similarity 0.82)
• Escalating trust guardianship distorts the original agency purpose (similarity 0.82)
• Trust is an irreducible tradeoff between over- and under-constraining agents. (similarity 0.80)
• Structural opportunity for agent abuse does not explain why agents actually seize it. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• The same factors enabling agency relationships create the opportunity for agent abuse. #corroborates (1.00) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 33
• Mechanisms for controlling impersonal trust themselves create new opportunities for abuse #expands (1.00) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 1
• Guardians of trust are themselves positioned to abuse the trust placed in them. #exemplifies (0.95) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 112
• Third-party trust guardians create new opportunities for exploitation. #exemplifies (0.95) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 141
• Controlling trust creates new opportunities for abuse in an inflationary spiral. #expands (0.88) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 145
• Trust is an irreducible tradeoff between over- and under-constraining agents. #expands (0.85)