Institutional trust guardians offer advance protection against future agent misconduct.

Evidence

A different group of institutional guardians of trust responds to the futures component of trust and the reality that most agency offerings are inherently contingent and therefore risky and uncertain. As noted earlier, one of the vulnerabilities of agency to abuse results from the fact that trustworthiness can often be ascertained only some considerable length of time after trust has been conferred. Some institutional guardians anticipate this possibility of normative or social control failures by providing advance protection against future deviant outcomes or compensation for accomplished misdeeds. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 103

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the temporal-lag problem in the reader’s understanding of trust: Raskolnikov’s guilt similarly becomes ascertainable only after his crime, needing a witness to make it socially legible. — connects to: Trusted agents face a dense lattice of institutional surveillance. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 92; Third-party trust guardians create new opportunities for exploitation. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 141; Guardians of trust are themselves trustees requiring ever-higher-order oversight — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 127 (+3 more)

Related

• The institutions that police trust are themselves trustees subject to the same agency problems. (similarity 0.89)
• Guardians of trust are themselves trustees requiring ever-higher-order oversight (similarity 0.88)
• Trusted agents face a dense lattice of institutional surveillance. (similarity 0.87)
• Escalating trust guardianship distorts the original agency purpose (similarity 0.86)
• Mechanisms for controlling impersonal trust themselves create new opportunities for abuse (similarity 0.84)
• Guardians of trust are themselves positioned to abuse the trust placed in them. (similarity 0.84)
• The same features enabling trust also enable agent abuse. (similarity 0.84)
• Third-party trust guardians create new opportunities for exploitation. (similarity 0.83)
• Even honest guardians may not actually deliver the protection principals assume. (similarity 0.82)
• The same factors enabling agency relationships create the opportunity for agent abuse. (similarity 0.81)
• The very mechanisms that enable trust also enable its abuse. (similarity 0.81)
• Controlling trust creates new opportunities for abuse in an inflationary spiral. (similarity 0.81)
• Trust institutions vary dramatically in the guardianship they receive (similarity 0.80)
• Trust constraint-setting trades false alarms against missed betrayals. (similarity 0.80)
• Trust is structurally vulnerable because agents can exploit principals’ ignorance and distance. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Third-party trust guardians create new opportunities for exploitation. #complicates (0.80) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 141
• Institutional and legal constraints give people strong external incentives to be trustworthy #corroborates (0.80)
• Guardians of trust are themselves trustees requiring ever-higher-order oversight #expands (0.78) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 127
• Guardians of trust are themselves positioned to abuse the trust placed in them. #complicates (0.75) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 112
• Trust rests on structural system guarantees that relieve individuals of risk assessment #corroborates (0.72)