The same factors enabling agency relationships create the opportunity for agent abuse.

Evidence

Yet these very factors that drive principals into agency relationships also offer opportunities for agent abuse (Clark 1985, p. 77). Trusted individual and organizational agents control property they do not own. They have the capacity to create wealth and discretion over the distribution of opportunity. Agents create and disseminate information that cannot be verified by its recipients because of their lack of expertise or access to data sources (Arrow 1985, pp. 38-39). — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 33

Categorization

• XREF: The principal-agent vulnerability applies directly to the reader’s Raskolnikov project — the dyadic relation between principal and trusted agent is structurally unstable, demanding a third-party auditor, mirroring Shapiro’s guardian and the Porfiry/Sonya dyad. — connects to: The same features enabling trust also enable agent abuse. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 33; Agency relationships multiply because scale creates access barriers to information and property. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 23; Mechanisms for controlling impersonal trust themselves create new opportunities for abuse — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 1 (+4 more)

Related

• The same features enabling trust also enable agent abuse. (similarity 0.94)
• Mechanisms for controlling impersonal trust themselves create new opportunities for abuse (similarity 0.86)
• The very mechanisms that enable trust also enable its abuse. (similarity 0.85)
• Agency relationships multiply because scale creates access barriers to information and property. (similarity 0.85)
• Trust is structurally vulnerable because agents can exploit principals’ ignorance and distance. (similarity 0.84)
• Third-party trust guardians create new opportunities for exploitation. (similarity 0.84)
• Risk-spreading strategies like securitization exacerbate agency abuse rather than reducing it. (similarity 0.83)
• Structural opportunity for agent abuse does not explain why agents actually seize it. (similarity 0.82)
• Controlling trust creates new opportunities for abuse in an inflationary spiral. (similarity 0.82)
• Institutional trust guardians offer advance protection against future agent misconduct. (similarity 0.81)
• Trust is structurally precarious because agents control symbolic wealth at a distance from principals. (similarity 0.80)
• Guardians of trust are themselves positioned to abuse the trust placed in them. (similarity 0.80)
• Secrecy and distance structurally prevent principals from monitoring agents. (similarity 0.80)
• Impersonal trust emerges where principals lose direct power to regulate agents. (similarity 0.80)
• The institutions that police trust are themselves trustees subject to the same agency problems. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• The very mechanisms that enable trust also enable its abuse. #corroborates (0.97) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 13
• Mechanisms for controlling impersonal trust themselves create new opportunities for abuse #corroborates (0.95) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 1
• Controlling trust creates new opportunities for abuse in an inflationary spiral. #expands (0.80) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 145
• Structural opportunity for agent abuse does not explain why agents actually seize it. #complicates (0.75) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 37
• Risk-spreading strategies like securitization exacerbate agency abuse rather than reducing it. #expands (0.72) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 38