The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956

Evidence

For de Gaulle, in his whole upbringing and career, the French army was everything—or almost everything—and its state of health was a far more pressing worry to him than either the F.L.N. or the pieds noirs. It was, however, no longer the same army that he had known so well in 1940–5, and since February 1956 its over-riding objective had been a political one; to push the authorities into carrying out a policy of Algérie française. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 948 (#expands, via linked claim)

From the French army’s point of view, their tragedy was that at various points they could see with agonising clarity (and not without reason) that they were winning the war militarily. But (not unlike the American commanders in Vietnam) it was not given them to perceive that, at the same time, their chances of winning the war politically and on the wider world stage were growing ever slimmer. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1653 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim
• XREF: connects to: By late 1956 both France’s military and diplomatic options in Algeria had failed; By 1956 the French army’s overriding aim became political, pushing Algérie française. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 948; Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria (+10 more)

Related

• By 1956 the French army’s overriding aim became political, pushing Algérie française. (similarity 0.90)
• Mollet’s political-warfare policies propelled the French army into politics. (similarity 0.89)
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria (similarity 0.88)
• By late 1956 both France’s military and diplomatic options in Algeria had failed (similarity 0.88)
• Military victory elevated the army to ultimate political arbiter in Algeria (similarity 0.88)
• The French army’s 1940 humiliation fueled its determination not to lose Algeria. (similarity 0.87)
• The French army’s will to win sprang from 1940 humiliation, not colonial ideals (similarity 0.87)
• The French army won militarily while losing the political and world battle (similarity 0.87)
• Algeria would be lost on France’s interior political front, not on the military front (similarity 0.86)
• France’s Algerian military dominance coexisted with its political weakness at home (similarity 0.86)
• Algeria’s 1959 campaign rehearsed the Ludendorff pattern of battlefield success and strategic failure (similarity 0.86)
• The army viewed any negotiated ceasefire as toppling its war effort in Algeria (similarity 0.85)
• Massive French troop increases failed to halt the rebellion’s spread in 1955-56. (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.84)
• Army officers saw the Algerian war as both career security and a noble cause. (similarity 0.84)

Broader Connections

• By 1956 the French army’s overriding aim became political, pushing Algérie française. #expands (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 948
• Mollet’s political-warfare policies propelled the French army into politics. #expands (0.45)
• Mollet tripled French troop levels in Algeria to half a million in 1956 #expands (0.40)
• The French army won militarily while losing the political and world battle #complicates (0.40) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1653
• Massive French troop increases failed to halt the rebellion’s spread in 1955-56. #contradicts (0.40) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 467
• The French army’s will to win sprang from 1940 humiliation, not colonial ideals #qualifies (0.40)
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria #complicates (0.35)
• Colonial military dominance ceased to be decisive in Algeria’s war. #complicates (0.35) — Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism, 114
• France’s 1940 defeat drove the army’s determination to win in Algeria #expands (0.30) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 526
• The French army’s 1940 humiliation fueled its determination not to lose Algeria. #expands (0.30)
• Dien Bien Phu compounded 1940 in driving France to win in Algeria. #expands (0.30)
• Suez guaranteed eventual Algerian independence while stiffening French resolve to win. #expands (0.30) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 496