OAS believed attacking French Communists would trap de Gaulle politically, but miscalculated.
Evidence
Sergent’s reasoning, echoing the self-deception that had haunted the French army all the way through the Algerian war, was that ever since 1954 the Communists had never ceased to be the principal ally of the F.L.N., and now “to live in peace with French Communism while carrying on the war with the Algerian rebels was and remains a nonsense or a treason”. A second, and perhaps even more naïve aim, was to force the Gaullists into an impossible position of either choosing to tolerate the angry reactions of the French Communist Party when attacked by the O.A.S., thus appearing as its accomplice, or to confront it and risk a breach with the Left. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1526
Categorization
- XREF: Echoes the army’s repeated misreading of political dynamics seen throughout the Algerian war. — connects to: The O.A.S. terror campaign backfired and sped French withdrawal from Algeria.; The OAS escalated to total war against French authority to force general paralysis
Related
- The O.A.S. continued assassinating de Gaulle long after Algeria fell. (similarity 0.85)
- The O.A.S. terror campaign backfired and sped French withdrawal from Algeria. (similarity 0.84)
- The OAS escalated to total war against French authority to force general paralysis (similarity 0.83)
- By 1956 the French army’s overriding aim became political, pushing Algérie française. (similarity 0.82)
- De Gaulle’s allies saw Algeria as subordinate to the French state’s crisis (similarity 0.82)
- France’s Algerian military dominance coexisted with its political weakness at home (similarity 0.81)
- De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.81)
- De Gaulle’s Algeria offensive aimed partly to distract the army from politics (similarity 0.81)
- The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956 (similarity 0.81)
- France believed wrongly that toppling Nasser would collapse the Algerian revolt. (similarity 0.81)
- Delouvrier’s withdrawal from Algiers demoralized the insurgents (similarity 0.80)
- Algeria’s moderate third force was crushed between the F.L.N. and the O.A.S. (similarity 0.80)
- A broad front of ex-ministers formed around Algérie française in 1960. (similarity 0.80)
- De Gaulle’s mystical self-assurance blinded him to the F.L.N.’s political character. (similarity 0.80)
- Killing French conscripts turned the army decisively against the O.A.S. (similarity 0.80)