A broad front of ex-ministers formed around Algérie française in 1960.

Evidence

Gradually, however, the F.N.F. slogans on the Algiers walls became replaced by new graffiti: F.A.F. or Front d’Algérie Française, with its aggressively virile symbol of a ram, which made its first appearance in the wake of de Gaulle’s appeal to the F.L.N. of 14 June. Initially, this time the centre of gravity of the new Front lay in France itself, where weekly meetings took place with such militant fallen angels of the Vincennes group as Soustelle and Bidault, and extreme right-wing politicians like Jean-Marie le Pen. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1277 (#expands, via linked claim)

For de Gaulle, in his whole upbringing and career, the French army was everything—or almost everything—and its state of health was a far more pressing worry to him than either the F.L.N. or the pieds noirs. It was, however, no longer the same army that he had known so well in 1940–5, and since February 1956 its over-riding objective had been a political one; to push the authorities into carrying out a policy of Algérie française. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 948 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The new Algérie Française movement was directed from within France by right-wing politicians — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1277; By 1956 the French army’s overriding aim became political, pushing Algérie française. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 948

Related

• The new Algérie Française movement was directed from within France by right-wing politicians (similarity 0.93)
• By 1956 the French army’s overriding aim became political, pushing Algérie française. (similarity 0.87)
• Algeria’s moderate third force was crushed between the F.L.N. and the O.A.S. (similarity 0.83)
• The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956 (similarity 0.83)
• France’s Algerian military dominance coexisted with its political weakness at home (similarity 0.83)
• The self-determination speech widened the split between France and the army and settlers (similarity 0.83)
• France’s refusal to restrain settler fascism drove liberal Algerians to the F.L.N. (similarity 0.81)
• Porous frontiers shaped the Algerian War’s outcome and de Gaulle’s rise (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.81)
• Army officers saw the Algerian war as both career security and a noble cause. (similarity 0.81)
• The F.L.N. created the G.P.R.A. to counter de Gaulle and reclaim the initiative. (similarity 0.81)
• Pied noir factions demanded a second front against FLN and Paris alike. (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle’s allies saw Algeria as subordinate to the French state’s crisis (similarity 0.81)
• Mollet’s political-warfare policies propelled the French army into politics. (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle’s 1958 arrival threatened the F.L.N. through fraternisation and a Muslim third force (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• The new Algérie Française movement was directed from within France by right-wing politicians #expands (0.75) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1277
• By 1956 the French army’s overriding aim became political, pushing Algérie française. #expands (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 948