The army viewed any negotiated ceasefire as toppling its war effort in Algeria

Evidence

To various units across the country he gave these categoric assurances: “There will be no Dien Bien Phu in Algeria. The insurrection will not throw us out of this country. Pacify. There is time. No need to be hustled….” Then, in scathing terms, he dismissed Ferhat Abbas’s call for “independence”, terming it “a monstrosity”, which could signify for the country nothing but “misery, a reduction to beggary [clochardisation], catastrophe…. When the Algerians will be able to choose, I do not think they will choose that. France must not leave. She has the right to be in Algeria. She will remain there….” — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1143 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Teitgen, a hero of the Resistance who had survived Dachau, was little disposed towards an army takeover in Algeria in any shape, and he could hardly believe his ears. At first he thought the bronzed and rugged general had gone slightly out of his mind. On second thoughts, however, he decided he should delve a bit deeper, and called Faure in for a further discussion, this time recording it all on a tape. Fortified with it, he then went to warn Lacoste. Distressed by this news, especially as he regarded Faure as a “stout-hearted sort” (un coeur généreux), the governor-general despatched Teitgen to Paris to inform the Minister of Defence, Bourgès-Maunoury. Teitgen has told how the minister’s immediate reaction was to hope that the affair would not “make it impossible for one to go ski-ing”, and asked him whether he had said anything to “ce con-là”, Mitterrand, then Minister of Justice. Shocked by Bourgeès-Maunoury’s apparently frivolous lack of interest, as well as his disrespect for a fellow minister, Teitgen then went on to see Mollet himself. Mollet took the matter much more seriously, but in turn used the same expression in deprecating Bourgès-Maunoury — “ce con-là”! Teitgen returned to Algiers, disquieted at the apparent lack of solidarity within the government. Faure was recalled and sentenced to thirty days’ fortress arrest — the first senior officer to suffer such a penalty for dissidence in Algeria. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 540 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Military victory elevated the army to ultimate political arbiter in Algeria — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 685; Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria; The self-determination speech instantly demoralized junior officers in Algeria — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1060 (+5 more)

Related

• Military commanders seized power in both Algeria and France at the same moment (similarity 0.88)
• Senior French officers plotted an army takeover in Algeria in early 1957 (similarity 0.88)
• Military victory elevated the army to ultimate political arbiter in Algeria (similarity 0.87)
• Mollet’s political-warfare policies propelled the French army into politics. (similarity 0.86)
• The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956 (similarity 0.85)
• Army officers saw the Algerian war as both career security and a noble cause. (similarity 0.85)
• The French army’s 1940 humiliation fueled its determination not to lose Algeria. (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle publicly promised the army France would stay in Algeria in early 1960. (similarity 0.83)
• A French army had not directly intervened in national politics since Napoleon’s coup (similarity 0.83)
• The self-determination speech instantly demoralized junior officers in Algeria (similarity 0.83)
• Sakiet’s fallout made the Algerian army feel betrayed by Paris. (similarity 0.83)
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria (similarity 0.83)
• The Algerian army command openly threatened to replace de Gaulle over self-determination. (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.82)
• The French army’s will to win sprang from 1940 humiliation, not colonial ideals (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• De Gaulle publicly promised the army France would stay in Algeria in early 1960. #contradicts (0.45) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1143
• Military victory elevated the army to ultimate political arbiter in Algeria #expands (0.40) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 685
• Senior French officers plotted an army takeover in Algeria in early 1957 #expands (0.40) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 540
• Civil government progressively surrendered civilian functions to the army in Algeria. #expands (0.40)
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria #complicates (0.35)
• The self-determination speech instantly demoralized junior officers in Algeria #complicates (0.35) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1060
• Soustelle predicted France would lose Algeria on the home front, not militarily. #corroborates (0.30) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 749
• After December 1960 the army, not the pieds noirs, drove events in Algeria #complicates (0.30)