Military commanders seized power in both Algeria and France at the same moment

Evidence

Teitgen, a hero of the Resistance who had survived Dachau, was little disposed towards an army takeover in Algeria in any shape, and he could hardly believe his ears. At first he thought the bronzed and rugged general had gone slightly out of his mind. On second thoughts, however, he decided he should delve a bit deeper, and called Faure in for a further discussion, this time recording it all on a tape. Fortified with it, he then went to warn Lacoste. Distressed by this news, especially as he regarded Faure as a “stout-hearted sort” (un coeur généreux), the governor-general despatched Teitgen to Paris to inform the Minister of Defence, Bourgès-Maunoury. Teitgen has told how the minister’s immediate reaction was to hope that the affair would not “make it impossible for one to go ski-ing”, and asked him whether he had said anything to “ce con-là”, Mitterrand, then Minister of Justice. Shocked by Bourgeès-Maunoury’s apparently frivolous lack of interest, as well as his disrespect for a fellow minister, Teitgen then went on to see Mollet himself. Mollet took the matter much more seriously, but in turn used the same expression in deprecating Bourgès-Maunoury — “ce con-là”! Teitgen returned to Algiers, disquieted at the apparent lack of solidarity within the government. Faure was recalled and sentenced to thirty days’ fortress arrest — the first senior officer to suffer such a penalty for dissidence in Algeria. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 540 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

During the first forty years of the présence française Algeria was chiefly run by the military; administration at the local level being in the hands of the Bureaux Arabes created by Marshal Bugeaud. These were adapted from the Turkish system, except that plenipotentiary powers resided with the French administrator, who combined the roles of governor, judge, inspector of taxes, technical adviser and welfare officer. Often these came to be highly expert in their field, as well as deeply dedicated to the welfare of the people under their charge. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 90 (#expands, via linked claim)

If the pieds noirs had shown they could sway Paris following Mollet’s disastrous visit in February 1956, here now was a new factor; the army as ultimate arbiter. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 685 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Military commanders privately authorized bombing and collective responsibility in Algeria.; Colonial Algeria’s local rule fused military and civilian power. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 90; Senior French officers plotted an army takeover in Algeria in early 1957 — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 540 (+3 more)

Related

• The army viewed any negotiated ceasefire as toppling its war effort in Algeria (similarity 0.88)
• Senior French officers plotted an army takeover in Algeria in early 1957 (similarity 0.87)
• Military commanders privately authorized bombing and collective responsibility in Algeria. (similarity 0.85)
• Military victory elevated the army to ultimate political arbiter in Algeria (similarity 0.85)
• Mollet’s political-warfare policies propelled the French army into politics. (similarity 0.84)
• A French army had not directly intervened in national politics since Napoleon’s coup (similarity 0.84)
• A coup plot against civil government in Algeria emerged in late 1956 (similarity 0.83)
• Algeria’s post-independence regime was captured by its wartime armed wing. (similarity 0.82)
• Army officers saw the Algerian war as both career security and a noble cause. (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle’s allies saw Algeria as subordinate to the French state’s crisis (similarity 0.81)
• The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956 (similarity 0.80)
• Colonial Algeria’s local rule fused military and civilian power. (similarity 0.80)
• Wartime Algeria indelibly shaped the post-1962 regime. (similarity 0.80)
• Granting Tunisian and Moroccan independence without Algeria was a strategic error. (similarity 0.80)
• French metropolitan democracy attenuated, while colonial Algeria criminalized, dissent against empire. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Senior French officers plotted an army takeover in Algeria in early 1957 #corroborates (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 540
• Colonial Algeria’s local rule fused military and civilian power. #expands (0.55) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 90
• Military victory elevated the army to ultimate political arbiter in Algeria #expands (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 685
• De Gaulle’s allies saw Algeria as subordinate to the French state’s crisis #exemplifies (0.45) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 849