French military pressure by 1958 drove A.L.N. morale collapse and mass defection

Evidence

“One could no longer move,” stated one of Mohand Ou El-Hadj’s lieutenants: … One no longer ate. I was so weak that I could no longer even manage to carry my sub-machine-gun. The establishment of military posts, the multiplying of self-defence communities and intelligence agents was making life impossible, and even survival itself…. It was only by executing traitors one after the other that we did manage to survive. But one was never able to regain the initiative. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1015 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

On the balance sheet, Challe’s own forces had suffered losses rarely exceeding a ratio of one to ten, a few hundred killed; while on his departure he reckoned that over half the regular katibas of the interior had been destroyed in the course of the past year’s offensives. The proportion of prisoners to killed had, significantly, risen to forty-two per cent from twenty-seven for the previous year, and a number of those who gave themselves up switched allegiances to join the harkis. In arms, the French claimed to have collected five for every one lost to the rebels (also a significant change from the early months of the war; the A.L.N. were losing 300 weapons net per month, and it was estimated that by September 1959 their logistic potential had sunk more than twenty per cent over the past year). Thus, statistically, the A.L.N. looked defeated by the time of Challe’s departure in 1960. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1019 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: The A.L.N. reached peak military strength in 1958 despite heavy losses; French offensives shattered the F.L.N.’s interior command-and-control network by 1959; F.L.N. propaganda caused mass defections within French-native army units (+13 more)

Broader Connections