Dien Bien Phu compounded 1940 in driving France to win in Algeria.

Evidence

If there is one factor which might be found lacking in, say, British army operations in Northern Ireland but which played an important role affecting the intensity of the war in Algeria, it was a certain peculiar determination within the regular French army that it should not be lost. This determination did not entirely spring from a belief in the sanctity of the présence française — less still from any kindred feeling for the pieds noirs — and to understand it one needs to recall sympathetically the recent history of the French army. Generals like Beaufre were captains at the time of the 1940 debacle, regimental commanders like Bigeard either N.C.O.s or lieutenants, and all remained profoundly conditioned by it. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 526 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

By historic chance, this first full meeting of the C.R.U.A. took place the day that the fall of Dien Bien Phu was announced. The impact on the Algerians, many of whose kinsmen had been fighting alongside the French in the besieged camp, was electric. Employing subtlest techniques of psychological warfare, the Viet-Minh suggestively quizzed the Algerians captured there: “Since you are such good soldiers, why do you fight for the colonialists? Why don’t you fight for yourselves and get yourselves a country of your own?” Suddenly this unbelievable defeat deprived the glorious French army of its baraka, making it look curiously mortal for the first time. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 241 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956; The French army’s 1940 humiliation fueled its determination not to lose Algeria.; France’s 1940 defeat drove the army’s determination to win in Algeria — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 526 (+6 more)

Broader Connections