Close communities substitute communal sanctioning norms for dyadic trust relationships
Evidence
When we have the thick relationships of a small, close community, we may find that our interactions are governed by norms of cooperativeness that are collective rather than dyadic. I behave well toward you because the community will sanction me if I do not. In such a case, the norms of cooperativeness may be sufficiently effective that we do not so readily develop dyadic trust relationships over many things, because those things are governed by the communal norms (Cook and Hardin 2000). — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 816
Categorization
Category: Causal Relationships
- XREF: Point of contrast for Saramago: communal norms require observable monitoring, which blindness destroys — forcing reliance back onto dyadic trust.
Related
- Community norms substitute for dyadic trust, so personal trust develops less. (similarity 0.89)
- Small close communities run on norms, while urban networks run on trust (similarity 0.81)
- Sanctions make trustworthiness a matter of self-interest rather than personal concern (similarity 0.81)
- Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members (similarity 0.81)
- Community norms can produce trustworthy behavior without producing encapsulated-interest trust (similarity 0.80)
- Moral dispositions are thin and unreliable beyond close communities (similarity 0.79)
- Small communities enforce generalized reciprocity rather than one-on-one exchange (similarity 0.79)
- Trust may have evolved from dense small-community interactions (similarity 0.79)
- Widespread civility and flourishing civil society reduce to shared personal trust (similarity 0.79)
- Confinement to one community makes reputational sanctions powerful enough to guarantee repayment (similarity 0.79)
- Overlapping relationships in close communities generate both knowledge and incentives for trust. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Social norms make people present stable identities that others can trust
#expands(0.85) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 292