Cooperative equilibria are no likelier than noncooperative ones without belief restrictions

Evidence

Even discounting these, I would still argue that — with respect to the time span of reasonable relevance to any given generation — the spontaneous evolution of a cooperative equilibrium among humans is only just as likely as that of a noncooperative one, unless some restriction is imposed on agents’ beliefs. — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2804

Categorization

• XREF: Crucial for the reader’s thesis: belief restrictions do the work — in Saramago, blindness itself is the restriction that should collapse trust, yet the sighted wife substitutes. — connects to: Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align; Cooperation unravels without iterated mutual knowledge of cooperative intentions.; Cooperation can operate independently of trust (+9 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2804

Broader Connections

• Cooperation unravels without iterated mutual knowledge of cooperative intentions. #corroborates (0.90)
• Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members #corroborates (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808
• Markets can organize exchange without requiring high levels of trust #corroborates (0.80)
• Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align #corroborates (0.78)
• Cooperation can operate independently of trust #corroborates (0.78)
• Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation #expands (0.75) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2781