Consistent self-serving calculations send inconsistent fairness signals to a community.

Evidence

There are several problems with this approach, though, some of which are identified by Baumard et al. Critically, an individual who would consistently apply this self-serving calculation would end up sending inconsistent signals to her community. Successfully hiding her undeserved benefits would increase the chances of earning or maintaining a reputation for fairness, but this reputation would be hurt every time she decides to disclose a given benefit. Furthermore, a single instance of being discovered would greatly increase the chances of earning or maintaining a reputation for deceitfulness. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 301

Categorization

• XREF: Directly supports the reader’s analytical frame: the fumi-e forced visible apostasy precisely because hidden concealment leaves partner-choice signals ambiguous, but public disclosure is individually costly. — connects to: Seemingly fair outcomes can arise from self-referent loss aversion rather than fairness preferences. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 312

Related

• Seemingly fair outcomes can arise from self-referent loss aversion rather than fairness preferences. (similarity 0.81)
• Beneficiaries of unfair gains face reputational pressure to conceal them, with discovery risking blackmail. (similarity 0.79)
• Fairness evolved as a costly signal of impartiality to avoid third-party condemnation. (similarity 0.78)
• Competitive signalling may drive moral conduct beyond mere fairness. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Seemingly fair outcomes can arise from self-referent loss aversion rather than fairness preferences. #expands (0.82) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 312