Rejecting the paix des braves is what ultimately let the F.L.N. win

Evidence

But with the hard-liners now well in the ascendant the interpretation the F.L.N. placed on the events of January 1960 was one of the overall weakness of the French position, presaging a total surrender to the maximum F.L.N. terms. With justification the hard-liners could point out that the first four years of fighting had overthrown the Fourth Republic and brought in de Gaulle and electoral franchise for Algerian Muslims; the next year had achieved “self-determination” and, now, the sixth year of the war had begun with Frenchmen firing on Frenchmen — altogether a not unsatisfactory balance. All that was required was to fight on for a few more months, a year or two at most, and de Gaulle would be forced to negotiate — on F.L.N. terms. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1173 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Their line of argument was that “self-determination” had been wrested from de Gaulle simply by five years of remorseless violence initiated by the F.L.N. — not by the softer methods of Abbas or Messali. The direct consequence of “self-determination” had been the negotiating table at Melun. And who had sat at it with the representatives of the French government? Not the men of Messali or Abbas, but delegates selected by the F.L.N. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1251 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim
  • XREF: connects to: F.L.N. hard-liners believed French weakness made continued fighting the winning strategy — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1173; War-weariness and compromise talk spread inside the F.L.N. after 13 May — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 962; The F.L.N. won the decisive political round just as the army defeated it militarily — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1061 (+3 more)

Broader Connections