The F.L.N. hard-liners won standing by crediting violence, not soft diplomacy, for concessions.

Evidence

Their line of argument was that “self-determination” had been wrested from de Gaulle simply by five years of remorseless violence initiated by the F.L.N. — not by the softer methods of Abbas or Messali. The direct consequence of “self-determination” had been the negotiating table at Melun. And who had sat at it with the representatives of the French government? Not the men of Messali or Abbas, but delegates selected by the F.L.N. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1251

Categorization

• XREF: This internal-F.L.N. hardline argument parallels the F.L.N.’s own logic justifying terror as the lever that produced self-determination. — connects to: Rejecting the paix des braves is what ultimately let the F.L.N. win; Terrorist attacks boosted the F.L.N.’s diplomatic standing despite revulsion — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 765; F.L.N. hard-liners believed French weakness made continued fighting the winning strategy — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1173 (+1 more)

Related

• Rejecting the paix des braves is what ultimately let the F.L.N. win (similarity 0.90)
• F.L.N. hard-liners believed French weakness made continued fighting the winning strategy (similarity 0.88)
• Hard-line F.L.N. leaders read the war’s trajectory as favoring continued fighting over compromise. (similarity 0.85)
• F.L.N. hard-liners treated negotiations as stalling devices to gain time. (similarity 0.84)
• F.L.N. hardliners pushed tighter population control that moderates feared would ruin negotiation prospects. (similarity 0.84)
• Both F.L.N. and French leaders adopted intransigent rhetoric to placate their army hard-liners (similarity 0.83)
• Rigid F.L.N. negotiating terms outlasted France’s shifting war aims (similarity 0.82)
• The F.L.N.’s deep historical mistrust of France drove its intransigent negotiating posture. (similarity 0.81)
• The FLN won self-determination just when it faced military defeat (similarity 0.81)
• Army hard-liners like Boumedienne drove the F.L.N.’s negotiators to intransigence. (similarity 0.81)
• Army hard-liners under Boumedienne challenged the F.L.N. political leadership (similarity 0.81)
• The F.L.N. won its main war goal despite impending military defeat (similarity 0.81)
• Post-independence leadership rivalries turned lethal within the F.L.N. (similarity 0.80)
• France’s refusal to restrain settler fascism drove liberal Algerians to the F.L.N. (similarity 0.80)
• The F.L.N. framed independence as seized, not granted. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• F.L.N. hard-liners believed French weakness made continued fighting the winning strategy #expands (0.85) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1173