F.L.N. hardliners pushed tighter population control that moderates feared would ruin negotiation prospects.

Evidence

Uncompromising and unrealistic as these terms may have seemed in the autumn of 1956, the F.L.N. negotiators were to stick to them, without amendment or modification, all the way through to the final act, thereby deriving an inestimable advantage over successive French governments, unable to define their war aims and negotiating from premises built on constantly shifting sands. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 450 (#expands, via linked claim)

In a defensive statement Krim admitted that the previous month’s fighting had been “the hardest of the war”, and that the A.L.N. of the “interior” had suffered heavy losses. He then came under fierce attack for failing to supply it with arms and reinforcements, and was criticised for being, though an excellent commander in the field, no chief-of-staff. The fact that his attackers included those who previously had been his loyal supporters made Krim seem increasingly isolated. At the centre of the attack appeared Boussouf, described by Claude Paillat as become “the Fouché of the rebellion, but a revolutionary Fouché like Saint-Just, and provided with troops like Napoleon”. Behind Boussouf, and strongly backed by his powerful patron, stood the silent and reflective figure of Boumedienne; a new force to be reckoned with, he emerged as the focal point of what were henceforth to be recognised as the hard-liners, the guerre à outrance faction of the F.L.N. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1171 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: F.L.N. hard-liners forced tighter civilian control despite harming the peace image.; de Gaulle’s backing of moderates collapsed as hard-liners took over the F.L.N.; Challe offensive losses fueled a hardliner coup within F.L.N. leadership — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1171 (+1 more)

Related

• de Gaulle’s backing of moderates collapsed as hard-liners took over the F.L.N. (similarity 0.91)
• The F.L.N. hard-line reshuffle doomed de Gaulle’s ‘association’ option (similarity 0.90)
• Challe offensive losses fueled a hardliner coup within F.L.N. leadership (similarity 0.88)
• Army hard-liners like Boumedienne drove the F.L.N.’s negotiators to intransigence. (similarity 0.87)
• F.L.N. leadership regrouped in Tunis after losing Algiers to the French. (similarity 0.86)
• Rigid F.L.N. negotiating terms outlasted France’s shifting war aims (similarity 0.86)
• The Algerian negotiating camp was deeply split between Boumedienne’s hard-liners and Krim’s politicos. (similarity 0.86)
• Army hard-liners under Boumedienne challenged the F.L.N. political leadership (similarity 0.86)
• Hard-line F.L.N. leaders read the war’s trajectory as favoring continued fighting over compromise. (similarity 0.85)
• Army chief-of-staff post shifted real F.L.N. power to Boumedienne’s hardliners (similarity 0.84)
• F.L.N. hard-liners believed French weakness made continued fighting the winning strategy (similarity 0.84)
• The F.L.N. hard-liners won standing by crediting violence, not soft diplomacy, for concessions. (similarity 0.84)
• The first paragraph blends description and foreshadowing of Boussouf and Boumedienne’s rise. (similarity 0.83)
• Rejecting the paix des braves is what ultimately let the F.L.N. win (similarity 0.83)
• French offensives shattered the F.L.N.’s interior command-and-control network by 1959 (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• de Gaulle’s backing of moderates collapsed as hard-liners took over the F.L.N. #expands (0.70)
• Rigid F.L.N. negotiating terms outlasted France’s shifting war aims #expands (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 450
• Challe offensive losses fueled a hardliner coup within F.L.N. leadership #expands (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1171