The F.L.N. refused any ceasefire before a full political settlement.

Evidence

Because of their basic mistrust there were a number of principles on which the F.L.N. negotiators could never yield. Chief among these was their intransigent refusal to permit any cease-fire in advance of a full political settlement. Against this, from Mendès-France onwards, successive French governments had insisted on a cease-fire first. This had been the impassable stumbling-block. The F.L.N.’s motivation here was basically quite simple; once the military revolt in the “interior” was stood down, if for whatever reason the emergent solution proved unacceptable, it would be extremely hard to get it going again. A second principle for which the F.L.N. had fought with equal persistence was that it, and it alone, represented the sole Algerian interlocuteur valable with whom France could discuss peace. There could be no other partner, no “third force”, whatever. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1419

The first practical disappointment for the French negotiators came with the resolute refusal of the F.L.N. to meet de Gaulle’s “unilateral truce” with anything resembling a reciprocal gesture. On the contrary. The period of May–June showed a fifty per cent increase in the rate of “incidents”; the wounded numbering 121, the dead eighty-five — which included sixty-two “third force” Muslims and twenty French soldiers. From Tunis Yazid declared: “An effective interruption of the fighting can only be the result of a bilateral accord bearing on the overall political problem.” As always, the F.L.N. was remaining rigidly faithful to the line laid down at Soummam in 1956, regardless of whatever concessions de Gaulle might feel impelled to offer; there could be no cease-fire of any sort before a political solution. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1427

Categorization

• XREF: The Soummam 1956 line recurs throughout the book; this documents its continued grip on the peace process. — connects to: Recognition of the F.L.N.’s negotiating status blocked every peace initiative.; The F.L.N. refused a prior cease-fire because renewed insurgency was impossible
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1419; Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1427

Related

• The F.L.N. refused a prior cease-fire because renewed insurgency was impossible (similarity 0.91)
• Recognition of the F.L.N.’s negotiating status blocked every peace initiative. (similarity 0.86)
• The F.L.N. forced the French to abandon every major negotiating demand in sequence. (similarity 0.84)
• The F.L.N.’s deep historical mistrust of France drove its intransigent negotiating posture. (similarity 0.84)
• Rejecting the paix des braves is what ultimately let the F.L.N. win (similarity 0.82)
• Recognition of the F.L.N. as sole negotiating partner was the core deadlock (similarity 0.82)
• Rigid F.L.N. negotiating terms outlasted France’s shifting war aims (similarity 0.82)
• Algerian refusal to compromise stripped away each French negotiating demand (similarity 0.81)
• Soummam’s fixed peace terms gave the F.L.N. lasting negotiating advantage. (similarity 0.81)
• Hard-line F.L.N. leaders read the war’s trajectory as favoring continued fighting over compromise. (similarity 0.81)
• F.L.N. hard-liners treated negotiations as stalling devices to gain time. (similarity 0.81)
• The F.L.N. framed independence as seized, not granted. (similarity 0.80)
• F.L.N. hardliners pushed tighter population control that moderates feared would ruin negotiation prospects. (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle’s peace offer meant truce, not capitulation, a distinction the F.L.N. missed. (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.80)