F.L.N. hard-liners believed French weakness made continued fighting the winning strategy

Evidence

But with the hard-liners now well in the ascendant the interpretation the F.L.N. placed on the events of January 1960 was one of the overall weakness of the French position, presaging a total surrender to the maximum F.L.N. terms. With justification the hard-liners could point out that the first four years of fighting had overthrown the Fourth Republic and brought in de Gaulle and electoral franchise for Algerian Muslims; the next year had achieved “self-determination” and, now, the sixth year of the war had begun with Frenchmen firing on Frenchmen — altogether a not unsatisfactory balance. All that was required was to fight on for a few more months, a year or two at most, and de Gaulle would be forced to negotiate — on F.L.N. terms. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1173

Categorization

• DEFINE: Shows how the hard-liner doctrine of fighting to maximum terms derived its rationale from a reading of French weakness.
• XREF: connects to: Rejecting the paix des braves is what ultimately let the F.L.N. win; Army hard-liners like Boumedienne drove the F.L.N.’s negotiators to intransigence.; Philippeville’s slaughter convinced the F.L.N. that terror paid strategically (+9 more)

Related

• Hard-line F.L.N. leaders read the war’s trajectory as favoring continued fighting over compromise. (similarity 0.91)
• Rejecting the paix des braves is what ultimately let the F.L.N. win (similarity 0.91)
• The F.L.N. hard-liners won standing by crediting violence, not soft diplomacy, for concessions. (similarity 0.88)
• Rigid F.L.N. negotiating terms outlasted France’s shifting war aims (similarity 0.87)
• F.L.N. hardliners pushed tighter population control that moderates feared would ruin negotiation prospects. (similarity 0.84)
• Army hard-liners like Boumedienne drove the F.L.N.’s negotiators to intransigence. (similarity 0.83)
• Both F.L.N. and French leaders adopted intransigent rhetoric to placate their army hard-liners (similarity 0.83)
• The F.L.N.’s deep historical mistrust of France drove its intransigent negotiating posture. (similarity 0.83)
• F.L.N. hard-liners treated negotiations as stalling devices to gain time. (similarity 0.82)
• The F.L.N. won its main war goal despite impending military defeat (similarity 0.82)
• F.L.N. attrition tactics stalled the war in the Aurès and frustrated the French (similarity 0.82)
• The F.L.N. forced the French to abandon every major negotiating demand in sequence. (similarity 0.82)
• Army hard-liners under Boumedienne challenged the F.L.N. political leadership (similarity 0.81)
• Military victory in the Battle of Algiers ultimately aided F.L.N. long-term goals. (similarity 0.81)
• Algerian refusal to compromise stripped away each French negotiating demand (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• The F.L.N.’s defeat in Algiers forced a strategic pivot that later yielded victory #complicates (0.60)
• Defeat in Algeria paradoxically produced a stronger France #contradicts (0.50)
• F.L.N. attrition tactics stalled the war in the Aurès and frustrated the French #exemplifies (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 329