The F.L.N. forced the French to abandon every major negotiating demand in sequence.

Evidence

Uncompromising and unrealistic as these terms may have seemed in the autumn of 1956, the F.L.N. negotiators were to stick to them, without amendment or modification, all the way through to the final act, thereby deriving an inestimable advantage over successive French governments, unable to define their war aims and negotiating from premises built on constantly shifting sands. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 450 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

On the day of the publication of simultaneous communiqués announcing the Evian talks, Louis Joxe, de Gaulle’s Minister for Algeria, committed what looked like a major gaffe. He announced that he would “be meeting the M.N.A. in parallel with the F.L.N.”. It was a last final attempt by France to resurrect the idea of a “third force” — and a thoroughly unsuccessful one. The G.P.R.A. exploded; here at the eleventh hour was France trying to turn the peace talks into a round-table affair; trying to do just what Ahmed Francis had always warned they would do — “produce a Bao-Dai out of a hat”. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1422 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Rigid F.L.N. negotiating terms outlasted France’s shifting war aims — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 450; Algerian refusal to compromise stripped away each French negotiating demand; France’s last attempt to create a third negotiating force collapsed instantly under F.L.N. pressure. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1422 (+2 more)

Related

• Algerian refusal to compromise stripped away each French negotiating demand (similarity 0.93)
• France’s last attempt to create a third negotiating force collapsed instantly under F.L.N. pressure. (similarity 0.89)
• Rigid F.L.N. negotiating terms outlasted France’s shifting war aims (similarity 0.89)
• Recognition of the F.L.N.’s negotiating status blocked every peace initiative. (similarity 0.85)
• The F.L.N. refused any ceasefire before a full political settlement. (similarity 0.84)
• A French attempt to revive a third force killed the first Evian talks (similarity 0.84)
• The failed putsch destroyed de Gaulle’s ability to enforce peace and forced negotiations (similarity 0.84)
• F.L.N. deliberately sabotaged its own negotiating openings to deny de Gaulle international credit (similarity 0.84)
• The generals’ putsch forced de Gaulle toward genuine negotiation while weakening his hand (similarity 0.84)
• Rejecting the paix des braves is what ultimately let the F.L.N. win (similarity 0.84)
• F.L.N. hard-liners treated negotiations as stalling devices to gain time. (similarity 0.84)
• Recognition of the F.L.N. as sole negotiating partner was the core deadlock (similarity 0.83)
• French negotiators wanted specific guarantees while the F.L.N. offered only vague goodwill (similarity 0.83)
• The F.L.N.’s deep historical mistrust of France drove its intransigent negotiating posture. (similarity 0.83)
• Soummam’s fixed peace terms gave the F.L.N. lasting negotiating advantage. (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Algerian refusal to compromise stripped away each French negotiating demand #corroborates (0.85)
• Rigid F.L.N. negotiating terms outlasted France’s shifting war aims #corroborates (0.75) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 450
• France’s last attempt to create a third negotiating force collapsed instantly under F.L.N. pressure. #corroborates (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1422
• The F.L.N. hard-line reshuffle doomed de Gaulle’s ‘association’ option #exemplifies (0.55)
• The failed putsch destroyed de Gaulle’s ability to enforce peace and forced negotiations #expands (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1408