The F.L.N. refused a prior cease-fire because renewed insurgency was impossible

Evidence

Because of their basic mistrust there were a number of principles on which the F.L.N. negotiators could never yield. Chief among these was their intransigent refusal to permit any cease-fire in advance of a full political settlement. Against this, from Mendès-France onwards, successive French governments had insisted on a cease-fire first. This had been the impassable stumbling-block. The F.L.N.’s motivation here was basically quite simple; once the military revolt in the “interior” was stood down, if for whatever reason the emergent solution proved unacceptable, it would be extremely hard to get it going again. A second principle for which the F.L.N. had fought with equal persistence was that it, and it alone, represented the sole Algerian interlocuteur valable with whom France could discuss peace. There could be no other partner, no “third force”, whatever. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1419 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Therefore on 28 September, the day of the referendum, a cease-fire was called in the terrorist offensive—an admission of failure clad under the rather thin pretext of a conciliatory gesture of goodwill. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 971 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The F.L.N. refused any prior cease-fire because restarting the revolt would be nearly impossible; The F.L.N. refused any ceasefire before a full political settlement. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1419; The F.L.N. halted French terrorism as an admission of failure — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 971

Related

• The F.L.N. refused any ceasefire before a full political settlement. (similarity 0.91)
• The F.L.N. halted French terrorism as an admission of failure (similarity 0.88)
• The F.L.N. framed independence as seized, not granted. (similarity 0.83)
• Recognition of the F.L.N.’s negotiating status blocked every peace initiative. (similarity 0.82)
• The F.L.N. forced the French to abandon every major negotiating demand in sequence. (similarity 0.81)
• Rejecting the paix des braves is what ultimately let the F.L.N. win (similarity 0.80)
• Algerian refusal to compromise stripped away each French negotiating demand (similarity 0.79)
• The cease-fire triggered worse violence instead of ending it. (similarity 0.79)
• The FLN committed to total war for full independence, not concessions (similarity 0.79)
• The F.L.N.’s deep historical mistrust of France drove its intransigent negotiating posture. (similarity 0.79)
• The F.L.N. moved its terrorism into metropolitan France in summer 1958 (similarity 0.79)
• The Battle of Algiers marked the end of any possibility of negotiated settlement (similarity 0.79)
• Rigid F.L.N. negotiating terms outlasted France’s shifting war aims (similarity 0.78)
• The F.L.N.’s Algiers urban operations failed almost entirely on the opening night (similarity 0.78)
• France’s refusal to restrain settler fascism drove liberal Algerians to the F.L.N. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• The F.L.N. refused any ceasefire before a full political settlement. #qualifies (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1419
• The F.L.N. halted French terrorism as an admission of failure #contradicts (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 971