F.L.N. deliberately sabotaged its own negotiating openings to deny de Gaulle international credit

Evidence

It was an adroitly calculated move, designed to provoke rejection by de Gaulle. For the G.P.R.A. recognised that the “self-determination” gambit had won for France more points both in Washington and at the United Nations than anything previously attempted; therefore, de Gaulle’s initiative could not be allowed to prosper, and he himself must be made to appear culpable for torpedoing it. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1170

Categorization

• SEED: Angle: how revolutionary movements rationally choose self-sabotage of peace prospects to win the international public-relations war — a counterintuitive strategic choice.
• XREF: connects to: The G.P.R.A. deliberately engineered its own rejection to discredit de Gaulle’s initiative.; French negotiators wanted specific guarantees while the F.L.N. offered only vague goodwill — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1428; The F.L.N. executed rebel commanders who had negotiated secretly with de Gaulle — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1192 (+1 more)

Related

• The G.P.R.A. deliberately engineered its own rejection to discredit de Gaulle’s initiative. (similarity 0.92)
• De Gaulle’s mystical self-assurance blinded him to the F.L.N.’s political character. (similarity 0.87)
• Recognition of the F.L.N. as sole negotiating partner was the core deadlock (similarity 0.87)
• Recognition of the F.L.N.’s negotiating status blocked every peace initiative. (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle feared even exploratory talks would imply recognition of F.L.N statehood (similarity 0.85)
• The F.L.N. created the G.P.R.A. to counter de Gaulle and reclaim the initiative. (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.84)
• The F.L.N. forced the French to abandon every major negotiating demand in sequence. (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle misjudged the F.L.N.’s political rather than military nature. (similarity 0.84)
• Gaulle misread the F L N as a conventional insurgency open to compromise. (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle’s soldier’s language misread F.L.N. psychology and ensured rejection of his peace offer. (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle agreed at once to meet secretly with a rebel commander (similarity 0.82)
• Renouncing Si Salah forced de Gaulle to negotiate solely with the FLN (similarity 0.81)
• Interior F.L.N. commanders sought a separate peace that bypassed the G.P.R.A. (similarity 0.81)
• Rejecting the paix des braves is what ultimately let the F.L.N. win (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• The F.L.N. executed rebel commanders who had negotiated secretly with de Gaulle #qualifies (0.55) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1192
• Recognition of the F.L.N. as sole negotiating partner was the core deadlock #complicates (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1165
• French negotiators wanted specific guarantees while the F.L.N. offered only vague goodwill #complicates (0.35) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1428