Allport claimed prejudice is normal cognition, not pathology

Evidence

Allport (1954/1979) argued that prejudice can be entirely normal. He also recognized that prejudice can be irrational. But his contentions in chapter 2 (“The Normality of Prejudgment”) effectively undermined the intuitive view that prejudice is solely the product of sick motives and anticipated psychology’s cognitive revolution by analyzing prejudice as a product of normal categorization processes, merely applied to people. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 282 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

As the title of chapter 2 in The Nature of Prejudice, “The Normality of Prejudgment,” proclaims, Allport understood prejudice and discrimination as byproducts of cognitive mechanisms that are typically functional in everyday life (e.g., categorization). His insights led directly to the socialcognitive revolution that continues to make an enormous contribution to the study of prejudice. Still, he wrestled with psychodynamic themes that permeated the field in his day, including the notion that people are instinctually destructive. He was openly critical of the tautology of this approach, noting that “widespread conflict does not mean in itself that instinct underlies it” (p. 214). However, psychodynamics held a place of prominence in The Nature of Prejudice. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 143 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

As the title of chapter 2 in The Nature of Prejudice, “The Normality of Prejudgment,” proclaims, Allport understood prejudice and discrimination as byproducts of cognitive mechanisms that are typically functional in everyday life (e.g., categorization). His insights led directly to the socialcognitive revolution that continues to make an enormous contribution to the study of prejudice. Still, he wrestled with psychodynamic themes that permeated the field in his day, including the notion that people are instinctually destructive. He was openly critical of the tautology of this approach, noting that “widespread conflict does not mean in itself that instinct underlies it” (p. 214). — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 143 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Cognitive biases are an inherited feature of all human brains, not curable — Lee McIntyre, Post-Truth, 115; Allport saw prejudice as the root problem, not categorization; Prejudice was reframed as a normal process, not pathology (+8 more)

Broader Connections

• Prejudice arises from normal cognition, not abnormal pathology #corroborates (0.99) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 282
• Allport saw prejudice as normal cognitive byproduct, not instinctual destructiveness #corroborates (0.98) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 143
• Allport framed prejudice as a byproduct of normally functional cognition #corroborates (0.97) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 143
• Allport’s precedent located intergroup bias in ordinary cognition, not pathology #corroborates (0.93) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 291
• Allport simultaneously held contradictory cognitive and psychodynamic theories of prejudice #complicates (0.78) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 99