Prejudice need not involve antipathy, inaccuracy, or inflexibility

Evidence

Representative national surveys documented a dramatic change from endorsement of racial segregation, discrimination, and the innate inferiority of Blacks to rejection of these practices and ideas (see Sears, ch. 21 this volume). However, Whites nonetheless often endorse beliefs denying that Blacks’ social and economic problems can be ascribed to external factors such as job discrimination, and ascribe them, implicitly or explicitly, to internal factors such as lack of motivation. Although such ideas have unfavorable implications for disadvantaged groups, they do not necessarily imply a generalized antipathy. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 181 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

We argue that the potential for prejudice exists when social perceivers hold a stereotype about a social group that is inconsistent with the attributes that are believed to be required for success in certain classes of social roles. We reject Allport’s (1954/1979) prescription that a stereotype must generally be an “exaggerated belief associated with a category” (p. 191). Regardless of the accuracy of the consensual beliefs held about a social group, prejudice consists of a lowering of the evaluation of members of the stereotyped group as occupants or potential occupants of an incongruent role, compared with the evaluation of members of groups for whom the role is congruent. This evaluative decline can occur regardless of whether or not the targeted individual fits the stereotype. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 190 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

For him, prejudice was not simply a conditioned prejudgment about an individual or group, it was a felt or expressed “antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (1954/1979, p. 9; see also Eagly & Diekman’s ch. 2 this volume). It was not simply a misperception or an expectation; it was a dislike or hatred. The basis for this aversion was factually wrong and impervious to correction because the aversion served important psychological functions for the prejudiced individual. Thus, Allport’s analysis went well beyond attention to a predisposition to prejudice; he also considered the role that prejudice plays in the life of the individual. He considered the fears, anxieties, and inadequacies to which prejudice speaks that make it resistant to correction and a source of viscous, inhumane acts. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 2565 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Antipathy is not required for prejudice — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 181; Prejudice does not require inaccurate or exaggerated stereotypes. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 190; Prejudice is antipathy based on inflexible generalization, not mere misperception — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 2565 (+10 more)

Broader Connections

• Antipathy is not required for prejudice #corroborates (0.97) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 181
• Prejudice does not require inaccurate or exaggerated stereotypes. #corroborates (0.95) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 190
• Prejudice is antipathy based on inflexible generalization, not mere misperception #contradicts (0.92) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 2565