Prejudice can operate as benevolence, not only antipathy

Evidence

Perhaps a victim of his time, he overlooked, as Rudman describes it, the “ordinariness of gender prejudice.” Only two pages of his book (pp. 33– 4) were dedicated to an analysis of sexism. Several chapters in our volume (Eagly & Diekman, Jackman, and Rudman) redress this oversight, drawing attention not only to the issue of sexism, but also to the inadequacy of defining prejudice solely as an antipathy. The consequence of this challenge to conceptions of the nature of prejudice is profound, suggesting that prejudice comes in qualitatively different forms, such as an ostensibly benevolent paternalism that disadvantages groups without apparent antipathy, that Allport and, for many years, the rest of the field, simply missed. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 139 (#expands, via linked claim)

Although the Allportian approach to sexism has been fruitful, the limitations of treating sexism purely as antipathy toward women are twofold. First, it does not take into account the fact that people often hold positive attitudes toward and beliefs about women. Second, it does not explain why women themselves are prone to maintaining the status quo. Recent advances in social-structural theories of prejudice address how seemingly benevolent forms of prejudice undermine women’s socioeconomic progress. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 758 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Allport’s most fundamental blindspot concerns his definition of prejudice as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (p. 9). Chapters by Eagly and Diekman, Jackman, and Rudman in the current volume explore how this definition has obscured important aspects of prejudice, both pragmatically and theoretically. Allport’s emphasis on antipathy directed the field toward types of prejudice that produce exclusion and violence, but it distracted the field from other types of bias involving more subtle types of control and exploitation (e.g., affectionate paternalism). — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 138 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Defining prejudice solely as antipathy blindspots subtler forms of domination; Prejudice need not involve antipathy, inaccuracy, or inflexibility; Benevolent paternalism operates as a subtle mechanism of prejudice that antipathy-based accounts miss (+9 more)

Broader Connections

• Prejudice takes benevolent paternalistic forms that disadvantage groups without antipathy #expands (0.95) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 139
• Prejudice toward women includes positive beliefs, not just antipathy #exemplifies (0.92) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 758
• Defining prejudice as antipathy blinds the field to paternalistic control forms #corroborates (0.92) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 138
• Prejudice is antipathy based on inflexible generalization, not mere misperception #complicates (0.85) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 2565