Defining prejudice solely as antipathy blindspots subtler forms of domination

Evidence

Allport’s most fundamental blindspot concerns his definition of prejudice as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (p. 9). Chapters by Eagly and Diekman, Jackman, and Rudman in the current volume explore how this definition has obscured important aspects of prejudice, both pragmatically and theoretically. Allport’s emphasis on antipathy directed the field toward types of prejudice that produce exclusion and violence, but it distracted the field from other types of bias involving more subtle types of control and exploitation (e.g., affectionate paternalism). — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 138 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Although the Allportian approach to sexism has been fruitful, the limitations of treating sexism purely as antipathy toward women are twofold. First, it does not take into account the fact that people often hold positive attitudes toward and beliefs about women. Second, it does not explain why women themselves are prone to maintaining the status quo. … Thus, implicit measures provide unique insights into the psychology of prejudice beyond the direct, explicit measures that were the tools of social psychology when The Nature of Prejudice was written. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 758 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

For him, prejudice was not simply a conditioned prejudgment about an individual or group, it was a felt or expressed “antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (1954/1979, p. 9; see also Eagly & Diekman’s ch. 2 this volume). It was not simply a misperception or an expectation; it was a dislike or hatred. The basis for this aversion was factually wrong and impervious to correction because the aversion served important psychological functions for the prejudiced individual. Thus, Allport’s analysis went well beyond attention to a predisposition to prejudice; he also considered the role that prejudice plays in the life of the individual. He considered the fears, anxieties, and inadequacies to which prejudice speaks that make it resistant to correction and a source of viscous, inhumane acts. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 2565 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim
• XREF: connects to: Defining prejudice as antipathy blinds the field to paternalistic control forms — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 138; Prejudice is antipathy based on inflexible generalization, not mere misperception — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 2565; Sexism challenges defining prejudice as antipathy — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 758 (+10 more)

Broader Connections

• Defining prejudice as antipathy blinds the field to paternalistic control forms #corroborates (0.98) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 138
• Sexism challenges defining prejudice as antipathy #corroborates (0.92) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 758
• Prejudice is antipathy based on inflexible generalization, not mere misperception #complicates (0.85) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 2565