Constitutional designers protect property from majority rule using supermajorities and courts

Evidence

Hayek (1960) for instance, discusses how a ”constitution of liberty” has to be based on limits on what the majority can do on the minority and he advocates supermajority rules and judicial control to prevent redistributive policies. — Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 186

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the public-choice/constitutional-economics literature on entrenchment and to the Lex Oppia sumptuary-law material on elite anxiety about redistribution. — connects to: Constitutional law defines governmental structure, powers, and limits — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 153; Ordinary statutes can carry quasi-constitutional entrenchment power — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 463; Statutory change often needs functional supermajorities despite majority-vote rhetoric — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 64