In focal-point bargaining small concessions signal collapse and are rejected
Evidence
The dependence of a “focal-point” solution on some characteristic that distinguishes it qualitatively from the surrounding alternatives has important dynamic considerations. For example, it often makes small concessions less likely than large ones; it often means that the focal point is more persuasive as an exact expected outcome than as an approximation. If a bargainer has persistently been unsuccessfully demanding 50 per cent, compromise at 47 per cent is unlikely; the small concession may be a sign of collapse. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 266
Categorization
- XREF: Directly connects to Gambetta’s private-protection-market model and Schelling’s own credible-commitments theme — the ‘Godfather bond’ logic where any concession reads as capitulation. — connects to: Nuclear arms negotiations are an open-ended bargaining problem beyond fixed payoff matrices — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 515; Concessions require an obvious stopping point to avoid signaling collapse — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 179; Complementary agreements are self-enforcing through interdependence and focal points — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 312