Normal modern trust is a pragmatic bargain mixing deference with scepticism.

Evidence

Many people, as it were, make a “bargain with modernity” in terms of the trust they vest in symbolic tokens and expert systems. The nature of the bargain is governed by specific admixtures of deference and scepticism, comfort and fear. Though we cannot escape the impact of modern institutions altogether, within the broad scope of attitudes of pragmatic acceptance many possible orientations can exist (or coexist, in true ambivalence). An individual may choose to move to a different area, for example, rather than drink fluoridated water, or drink bottled water rather than use that from the tap. It would be an extreme attitude, however, to refuse to use piped water altogether. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 221

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘bargain with modernity’ is precisely what Stevens refuses—his deference is total, with zero scepticism, which is why his ethical abdication is total. Strong counterpoint for the reader’s thesis. — connects to: Pragmatism relates to ancient skepticism via valuing opinions by utility — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 399; Trust is confidence expressing faith in others’ probity or in abstract principles. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 88; Trust operates through uncommunicated inferences rather than explicit justification (+2 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: The ‘bargain with modernity’ formulation crystallizes how normal trust is necessarily ambivalent, and thus how a trust without ambivalence becomes abdication—a dense, reusable insight.

Related

• Trust is required only amid ignorance, which always grounds scepticism as well. (similarity 0.83)
• Familiarity prevents trust from becoming a conscious problem; doubt reopens it. (similarity 0.83)
• Differences in trust are epistemological, not psychological or irrational. (similarity 0.83)
• Trust in abstract systems is tacit routine, not conscious choice. (similarity 0.82)
• System trust produces a compulsion to trust a system one cannot correct (similarity 0.82)
• Trust is defined by the reason for expectation, not the expectation itself (similarity 0.81)
• Openly negotiated interdependence undermines trust that existing systems breed silently (similarity 0.81)
• Trust is a faith-like commitment, not mere cognitive calculation (similarity 0.81)
• Modern trust is vested in abstract capacities, not individuals (similarity 0.81)
• Trust differs from confidence in that trust acknowledges alternatives and risks, confidence does not. (similarity 0.81)
• Trust is confidence expressing faith in others’ probity or in abstract principles. (similarity 0.81)
• Most trust is unreflective, routinized background assumption rather than calculated risk (similarity 0.81)
• Even pragmatic faith in expert systems still implies trust (similarity 0.81)
• Giddens describes how trust in abstract systems develops as ‘faceless commitments,’ yet notes relations of trust are always ambivalent because confidence is needed amid fundamental ignorance of… (similarity 0.80)
• The genuine antithesis of basic trust is existential dread, not mere mistrust. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Pragmatism relates to ancient skepticism via valuing opinions by utility #corroborates (0.60) — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 399
• Trust is confidence expressing faith in others’ probity or in abstract principles. #expands (0.55) — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 88
• Trust operates through uncommunicated inferences rather than explicit justification #expands (0.50)
• Trust is willed action taken despite an information deficit. #expands (0.50)
• Trust rests on structural system guarantees that relieve individuals of risk assessment #contradicts (0.45)