Even pragmatic faith in expert systems still implies trust

Evidence

An element of Simmel’s “weak inductive knowledge” is no doubt very often present in the confidence which lay actors sustain in expert systems. There is a pragmatic element in “faith,” based upon the experience that such systems generally work as they are supposed to do. In addition, there are often regulatory agencies over and above professional associations designed to protect the consumers of expert systems—bodies which licence machines, keep a watch over the standards of aircraft manufacturers, and so forth. None of this, however, alters the observation that all disembedding mechanisms imply an attitude of trust. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 77

Categorization

  • XREF: Shows why Stevens’s decades of serving Darlington — a kind of empirical ‘weak inductive knowledge’ — can never become the moral verification that would have exposed the Nazi appeasement; trust persists despite evidence. — connects to: Controlling system trust becomes the exclusive work of experts; Trust clues only reduce risk, never eliminate the leap of faith. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 171; Confidence in expert systems can be catastrophically misplaced — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 13 (+6 more)

Broader Connections