Trust is required only amid ignorance, which always grounds scepticism as well.
Evidence
However, at the same time, lay attitudes to science and to technical knowledge generally are typically ambivalent. This is an ambivalence that lies at the core of all trust relations, whether it be trust in abstract systems or in individuals. For trust is only demanded where there is ignorance—either of the knowledge claims of technical experts or of the thoughts and intentions of intimates upon whom a person relies. Yet ignorance always provides grounds for scepticism or at least caution. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 220
Categorization
- XREF: The ambivalence at the core of trust explains why Stevens’s pure, unambivalent system trust is pathological rather than normal—normal trust coexists with scepticism, his does not. — connects to: Trust clues only reduce risk, never eliminate the leap of faith. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 171; Giddens describes how trust in abstract systems develops as ‘faceless commitments,’ yet notes relations of trust are always ambivalent because confidence is needed amid fundamental ignorance of the social world. — Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (excerpt); Trust arises not from powerlessness but from lack of full information about others. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 84 (+3 more)
Related
- Most people are more inclined to trust people they know than to trust remote expertise or an abstract system, so contemporary life demands trust in science they cannot personally verify. (similarity 0.87)
- Trust arises not from powerlessness but from lack of full information about others. (similarity 0.87)
- Giddens describes how trust in abstract systems develops as ‘faceless commitments,’ yet notes relations of trust are always ambivalent because confidence is needed amid fundamental ignorance of… (similarity 0.86)
- Trust is willed action taken despite an information deficit. (similarity 0.85)
- Familiarity prevents trust from becoming a conscious problem; doubt reopens it. (similarity 0.85)
- Trust is confidence expressing faith in others’ probity or in abstract principles. (similarity 0.84)
- People are honest unless they have a reason not to be and believe others unless suspicion is triggered — the very thought of doubt ‘does not even come to mind’, so trust operates routinely… (similarity 0.84)
- Trust involves a calculable asymmetry of possible harm, while hope does not (similarity 0.83)
- All trust is blind trust, being the link between faith and confidence. (similarity 0.83)
- Normal modern trust is a pragmatic bargain mixing deference with scepticism. (similarity 0.83)
- Trust substitutes knowledge of system structure for unavailable information about others. (similarity 0.83)
- Even pragmatic faith in expert systems still implies trust (similarity 0.82)
- Giddens defines trust as confidence in the reliability of a person or system expressing faith in the probity or love of another or in the correctness of abstract principles, and notes all trust is… (similarity 0.82)
- Trust in experts is trust in impersonal systems, not in individuals (similarity 0.82)
- Trusting always exceeds available evidence; reasons for trust are retrospective self-justification (similarity 0.82)
Broader Connections
- Trust arises not from powerlessness but from lack of full information about others.
#corroborates(0.85) — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 84 - Trusting always exceeds available evidence; reasons for trust are retrospective self-justification
#corroborates(0.70) - Familiarity prevents trust from becoming a conscious problem; doubt reopens it.
#qualifies(0.60) - No genuine knowledge can be derived from a state of ignorance
#corroborates(0.55) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 1077