Moral self-regulation is not a fixed conscience but can be selectively disengaged

Evidence

Albert Bandura, in his 1986 book, Social Foundations of Thought and Action, gave us an account that addresses what is accomplished within the individual by the conversion process. He suggested that normal socialization processes produce what he called a “selfregulatory system,” which functions to regulate and control the actions of the normally functioning individual. However, these control mechanisms do not operate in invariant ways. “Development of self-regulatory capabilities does not create an invariant control mechanism, as implied by theories of internalization that incorporate entities such as conscience and superego as continuous internal overseers of conduct” (p. 375). He went on to remark that “self-evaluative influences do not operate unless activated” (p. 375), and it is also the case that they can be selectively disengaged as well. This might work as follows. Normally, people do not indulge in censurable behaviors because these will produce self-devaluative consequences as a result of the working of the self-regulatory system. However, “what is culpable can be made honorable through cognitive restructuring” (p. 376). One can morally justify harmdoing, find euphemistic labels for the action, minimize the harmful consequences, and dehumanize and blame the victim. There are also the usual possibilities of displacing responsibility for the detrimental actions elsewhere in the system. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3940

Bandura, in his 1986 book, Social Foundations of Thought and Action, gave us an account that addresses what is accomplished within the individual by the conversion process. He suggested that normal socialization processes produce what he called a “selfregulatory system,” which functions to regulate and control the actions of the normally functioning individual. However, these control mechanisms do not operate in invariant ways. “Development of self-regulatory capabilities does not create an invariant control mechanism, as implied by theories of internalization that incorporate entities such as conscience and superego as continuous internal overseers of conduct” (p. 375). He went on to remark that “self-evaluative influences do not operate unless activated” (p. 375), and it is also the case that they can be selectively disengaged as well. This might work as follows. Normally, people do not indulge in censurable behaviors because these will produce self-devaluative consequences as a result of the working of the self-regulatory system. However, “what is culpable can be made honorable through cognitive restructuring” (p. 376). One can morally justify harmdoing, find euphemistic labels for the action, minimize the harmful consequences, and dehumanize and blame the victim. There are also the usual possibilities of displacing responsibility for the detrimental actions elsewhere in the system. These are the family of processes that seem to me to be involved in creating individuals who willingly do evil. That they often occur together, and that many of them are frequently caused by the same circumstances, is undeniable. It is the fact that many of these processes are involved in the conversion process, and that the individual is in some unstable and dynamic state—now relying on one justification, now on another—that seems to me to become obscured when an altered state is postulated. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3940

A comprehensive theory of morality must address its dual aspects. The first aspect, which centers on the acquisition of moral standards and moral reasoning, constitutes mainly the cognitive side of morality. The second aspect of a theory of morality addresses the motivational and self-regulatory mechanisms whereby moral thought gets translated into moral action. Specification of the mechanisms that link thought to action is a vital feature of a comprehensive theory of morality because it focuses on the locus where moral agency is exercised. However, moral theorists usually ignore the gap in moral theorizing, leaving the impression that moral thought automatically begets moral action. In the agentic theory, as will be explained shortly, affective self-sanctions are the major mechanism by which people come to live in accordance with their moral standards. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 211

Categorization

• DEFINE: Covers Bandura’s self-regulatory system and the concept of selective moral disengagement.
• XREF: This is the classic moral disengagement framework also discussed in Bandura’s work on media violence and on euphemistic language like ‘collateral damage.’ — connects to: Technological rationality neutralizes guilt and conscience under reification — Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the…, 346; Moral lines like ‘no torture’ hold only as impulse, not as rationalized principle — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 2562; Conscience operates as inward self-cruelty, not mere restraint — Wendy Brown, In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise…, 282 (+1 more)
• QUESTION: If moral self-regulation is a fluid, situationally activated system rather than an on/off state, does this imply strategic/ironic identity performance is likewise situationally sustainable rather than collectively statable?
• corroborated: 4 independent passages support this claim — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3940; John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology: Key Readings, 3940; Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 211