Internal moral self-sanctions can be neutralized by psychosocial mechanisms

Evidence

At the agency locus, people evade personal accountability for harmful conduct by displacing responsibility to others and by dispersing it widely so that no one bears responsibility. This absolves them of blame for the harm they cause. At the outcome locus, perpetrators disregard, minimize, distort, or even dispute the injurious effects of their actions. As long as harmful effects are out of sight and out of mind there is no moral issue to contend with because no perceived harm has been done. At the victim locus, perpetrators exclude those they maltreat from their category of humanity by divesting them of human qualities or attributing animalistic qualities to them. Rendering their victims subhuman weakens moral qualms over treating them harshly. The additional moral disengagement at the victim locus blames the victims for bringing the maltreatment on themselves or attributes it to compelling circumstances. In this mode of self-exoneration, perpetrators view themselves as victims forced to behave injuriously by wrongdoers’ offensive behavior or by force of circumstances. By viewing themselves as victims, they may feel self-righteous in their retaliatory actions. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 62 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Moral disengagement is the process through which we free ourselves from the negative consequences, primarily, but not exclusively, of a psychological nature (e.g., distress, shame, loss of reputation) that would likely follow should we acknowledge certain negative actions that we have committed (Bandura, 1999). Amid these strategies are euphemistic labeling (e.g., “collateral damage”), moral justification (“it is a battle against evil”), and dehumanization. The latter has received quite a lot of attention in psychological literature, and its function is well described by psychologist Albert Bandura. He argues that perceiving another person as human activates empathetic reactions that would make it difficult to mistreat him or her without risking personal distress, but that once the other is dehumanized, such self-sanctions for mistreatment can be disengaged (Bandura, 1990). — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2096 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Albert Bandura, in his 1986 book, Social Foundations of Thought and Action, gave us an account that addresses what is accomplished within the individual by the conversion process. He suggested that normal socialization processes produce what he called a “selfregulatory system,” which functions to regulate and control the actions of the normally functioning individual. However, these control mechanisms do not operate in invariant ways. “Development of self-regulatory capabilities does not create an invariant control mechanism, as implied by theories of internalization that incorporate entities such as conscience and superego as continuous internal overseers of conduct” (p. 375). He went on to remark that “self-evaluative influences do not operate unless activated” (p. 375), and it is also the case that they can be selectively disengaged as well. This might work as follows. Normally, people do not indulge in censurable behaviors because these will produce self-devaluative consequences as a result of the working of the self-regulatory system. However, “what is culpable can be made honorable through cognitive restructuring” (p. 376). One can morally justify harmdoing, find euphemistic labels for the action, minimize the harmful consequences, and dehumanize and blame the victim. There are also the usual possibilities of displacing responsibility for the detrimental actions elsewhere in the system. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3940 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Institutional evil requires a social psychology of how settings override members’ moral scruples — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology: Key Readings, 4030; The Freudian self is animality governed by an internal moral garrison. — Alain Ehrenberg, The Weariness of the Self: Diagnosing…, 256; Moral self-regulation is not a fixed conscience but can be selectively disengaged — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3940 (+11 more)

Broader Connections

• People disengage moral self-sanctions through euphemism, justification, and dehumanization #exemplifies (0.95) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2096
• Diffusion of responsibility, distortion of harm, and dehumanization each neutralize moral restraint #exemplifies (0.95) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 62
• Moral self-regulation is not a fixed conscience but can be selectively disengaged #expands (0.92) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3940
• Perpetrators neutralize moral self-sanctions at three loci of harmful conduct. #expands (0.92) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 62