Collective psyches cannot develop self-awareness, so institutions stay morally blind

Evidence

Moral behaviour is conceivable only in the context of coexistence, of ‘being with others’, that is, a social context; but it does not owe its appearance to the presence of supra-individual agencies of training and enforcement, that is, of a societal context. — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 499 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Albert Bandura, in his 1986 book, Social Foundations of Thought and Action, gave us an account that addresses what is accomplished within the individual by the conversion process. He suggested that normal socialization processes produce what he called a “selfregulatory system,” which functions to regulate and control the actions of the normally functioning individual. However, these control mechanisms do not operate in invariant ways. “Development of self-regulatory capabilities does not create an invariant control mechanism, as implied by theories of internalization that incorporate entities such as conscience and superego as continuous internal overseers of conduct” (p. 375). He went on to remark that “self-evaluative influences do not operate unless activated” (p. 375), and it is also the case that they can be selectively disengaged as well. This might work as follows. Normally, people do not indulge in censurable behaviors because these will produce self-devaluative consequences as a result of the working of the self-regulatory system. However, “what is culpable can be made honorable through cognitive restructuring” (p. 376). One can morally justify harmdoing, find euphemistic labels for the action, minimize the harmful consequences, and dehumanize and blame the victim. There are also the usual possibilities of displacing responsibility for the detrimental actions elsewhere in the system. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3940 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Moral self-regulation is not a fixed conscience but can be selectively disengaged — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3940; Collective moral disengagement is an emergent group property, not a sum of individuals — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 686; Collective moral disengagement arises from members mutually exonerating each role in a shared system — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 685 (+10 more)

Broader Connections

• Moral capacity arises socially but not from societal institutions #complicates (0.73) — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 499
• Moral self-regulation is not a fixed conscience but can be selectively disengaged #complicates (0.72) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3940