Self-regulation explains long-term enterprise generally, not moral sense specifically.

Evidence

For Ainslie, the psychological basis of moral choice is a more general ability to adopt personal rules so as to resist the lure of short-term rewards and pursue more valuable long-term interest, since, he writes, “The payoffs for selfish choices are almost always faster than the payoffs for moral ones.” Similarly, Ainsworth & Baumeister point out that “fairness impulses must compete in the psyche against selfish impulses” and argue that self-regulation – that is, “the executive capacity to adjudicate among competing motivations, especially in favor of socially and culturally valued ones” – must play “a decisive role in social cooperation.” … Such an ability, however, is relevant not just to moral behavior but also to any form of long-term enterprise, from the raising of cattle to the waging of war. So, at best, the ability to pursue long-term goals together with a good understanding of the role of reputation in cooperation might cause rational individuals to decide to be systematically fair (as suggested by Gauthier 1986), which is quite different from having an intuitive moral sense. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 655

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to the reader’s framework of ‘Big God’ morality and the fumi-e ritual: distinguishing rational self-control from intuitive moral sense bears on whether Rodrigues’ fairness is regulation-based or genuinely moral. — connects to: Moral behavior depends on self-control, but kin altruism does not. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 249; Self-regulation operates like a depletable willpower resource. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 244; Cooperation requires self-regulation because its costs are immediate but its benefits are delayed — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 243 (+3 more)

Broader Connections