Moral agency involves partial rather than absolute personal control over conduct
Evidence
All too often, disputes about personal control are framed in dichotomous, absolute terms, especially in philosophical disputes. Either one can exercise control at will or one is a conscious automaton driven by conditions beyond one’s control. In moral agency, individuals can exercise some measure of control over how situations influence them and how they shape their situations. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 327
Categorization
- DEFINE: Positioning statement: moral agency is neither free will nor automatism but situated partial control — the frame on which the rest of the moral-disengagement architecture depends.
- corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 327
- XREF: connects to: Agency is best theorized as accomplished social action, not individual autonomy. — Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall, Identity and Interaction: A…, 114