Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will

Evidence

At a certain higher stage of morality, the motivation of action lies no longer in a real-human, even though super-individual power; at this stage, the spring of moral necessities flows beyond the contrast between individual and totality. For, as little as these necessities derive from society, as little do they derive from the singular reality of individual life. In the free conscience of the actor, in individual reason, they only have their bearer, the locus of their efficacy. Their power of obligation stems from these necessities themselves, from their inner, super-personal validity, from an objective ideality which we must recognize, whether or not we want to, in a manner similar to that in which the validity of a truth is entirely independent of whether or not the truth becomes real in any consciousness. — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines Simmel’s third stage of moral motivation, where the ought is objective and super-personal, transcending both individual and group.
• XREF: connects to: Moral rules cannot be created or altered by deliberate human enactment — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 443; Legal systems rest on customary social rules rather than moral foundations — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 56; The felt obligation to continue charity presupposes a preexisting moral bond. — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 427 (+24 more)

Related

• Nothing in society is eternal, so moral standards must be revised (similarity 0.85)
• Moral obligations require overriding force that natural selection doesn’t explain (similarity 0.83)
• Can we say that we have, in principle at least, the same reasons for meeting our legal obligations that we have for meeting our moral obligations? (similarity 0.83)
• An ethics cannot be derived directly from ontological descriptions (similarity 0.81)
• The felt obligation to continue charity presupposes a preexisting moral bond. (similarity 0.81)
• Duty-based moralities subordinate the individual to maintenance of social norms. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Moral rules cannot be created or altered by deliberate human enactment #corroborates (0.60) — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 443
• Legal systems rest on customary social rules rather than moral foundations #contradicts (0.50) — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 56