Can we say that we have, in principle at least, the same reasons for meeting our legal obligations that we have for meeting our moral obligations?

Evidence

At a certain higher stage of morality, the motivation of action lies no longer in a real-human, even though super-individual power; at this stage, the spring of moral necessities flows beyond the contrast between individual and totality. For, as little as these necessities derive from society, as little do they derive from the singular reality of individual life. In the free conscience of the actor, in individual reason, they only have their bearer, the locus of their efficacy. Their power of obligation stems from these necessities themselves, from their inner, super-personal validity, from an objective ideality which we must recognize, whether or not we want to, in a manner similar to that in which the validity of a truth is entirely independent of whether or not the truth becomes real in any consciousness. — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

We make an important distinction between law and even the general orders of a gangster. We feel that the law’s strictures-and its sanctions-are different in that they are obligatory in a way that the outlaw’s commands are not. Austin’s analysis has no place for any such distinction, because it defines an obligation as subjection to the threat of force, and so founds the authority of law entirely on the sovereign’s ability and will to harm those who disobey. Perhaps the distinction we make is illusory-perhaps our feelings of some special authority attaching to the law is based on religious hangover or another sort of mass self-deception. But Austin does not demonstrate this, and we are entitled to insist that an analysis of our concept of law either acknowledge and explain our attitudes, or show why they are mistaken. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40 (#expands, via linked claim)

Austin had said that every rule is a general command, and that a person is obligated under a rule if he is liable to be hurt should he disobey it. Hart points out that this obliterates the distinction between being obliged to do something and being obligated to do it. If one is bound by a rule he is obligated, not merely obliged, to do what it provides, and therefore being bound by a rule must be different from being subject to an injury if one disobeys an order. A rule differs from an order, among other ways, by being normative, by setting a standard of behavior that has a call on its subject beyond the threat that may enforce it. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 47 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Day in and day out we send people to jail, or take money away from them, or make them do things they do not want to do, under coercion of force, and we justify all of this by speaking of such persons as having broken the law or having failed to meet their legal obligations, or having interfered with other people’s legal rights. Even in clear cases (a bank robber or a willful breach of contract), when we are confident that someone had a legal obligation and broke it, we are not able to give a satisfactory account of what that means, or why that entitles the state to punish or coerce him. We may feel confident that what we are doing is proper, but until we can identify the principles we are following we cannot be sure that they are sufficient, or whether we are applying them consistently. In less clear cases, when the issue of whether an obligation has been broken is for some reason controversial, the pitch of these nagging questions rises, and our responsibility to find answers deepens.; Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40; Normative obligation differs fundamentally from being threatened into compliance. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 47 (+1 more)

Related

• Day in and day out we send people to jail, or take money away from them, or make them do things they do not want to do, under coercion of force, and we justify all of this by speaking of such… (similarity 0.87)
• Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force (similarity 0.87)
• Normative obligation differs fundamentally from being threatened into compliance. (similarity 0.85)
• A rule differs from an order, among other ways, by being normative, by setting a standard of behavior that has a call on its subject beyond the threat that may enforce it. A rule can never be… (similarity 0.83)
• Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will (similarity 0.83)
• Concepts of law and legal obligation must stay until shown illusory (similarity 0.83)
• Legal coercion lacks a satisfactory account even in clear cases (similarity 0.82)
• Moral obligations require overriding force that natural selection doesn’t explain (similarity 0.82)
• Hart points out that Austin’s view that every rule is a general command obliterates the distinction between being obliged to do something and being obligated to do it. If one is bound by a rule he… (similarity 0.81)
• Rights and obligations can bind genuinely without being absolute. (similarity 0.80)
• Obligation arises when social pressure and general demand for conformity are intense (similarity 0.80)
• Legal nominalists treat law and obligation as myths to be discarded (similarity 0.79)
• Ronald M. Dworkin — The Model of Rules (similarity 0.79)
• The concepts of legal right and obligation, despite daily reliance, resist clear definition. (similarity 0.79)
• Unlawful power is real, not a mere negatable possibility (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will #corroborates (0.75) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356
• Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force #expands (0.55) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40
• Normative obligation differs fundamentally from being threatened into compliance. #expands (0.55) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 47