The felt obligation to continue charity presupposes a preexisting moral bond.

Evidence

The case just mentioned is much more complicated than the related principle, homologous to odisse quem laeseris, which says that one loves the one to whom he has done good. It is understandable that one projects the satisfaction of his own good action on the one who has given him the opportunity for it: in the love for the one for whom he has made sacrifices he loves in essence himself, just as in the hate against the one to whom he has done an injustice he hates himself. The sense of obligation that the good action leaves in the doer of good, that particular form of noblesse oblige, cannot be explained with so simple a psychology. I believe that, in effect, an a priori condition is involved here: that each action of this type—despite its apparent free will, despite its apparent character of opus supererogationis—derives from an obligation; that in such behavior a profound obligation is implicit which, in a certain way, is manifested and made visible through action. — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 427

Categorization

• DEFINE: Introduces the inversion of ‘odisse quem laeseris’ (hate whom you have injured) into ‘love whom you have helped,’ plus the idea of charity as revealed obligation.
• XREF: connects to: Instrumentalizing charity alienates individuals more radically than explicit communal sacrifice does — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 413; Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356; Generosity presupposes original plenitude; dialectical lack undercuts the power to give. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 688

Related

• Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will #corroborates (0.55) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356