An ethics cannot be derived directly from ontological descriptions

Evidence

At a certain higher stage of morality, the motivation of action lies no longer in a real-human, even though super-individual power; at this stage, the spring of moral necessities flows beyond the contrast between individual and totality. For, as little as these necessities derive from society, as little do they derive from the singular reality of individual life. In the free conscience of the actor, in individual reason, they only have their bearer, the locus of their efficacy. Their power of obligation stems from these necessities themselves, from their inner, super-personal validity, from an objective ideality which we must recognize, whether or not we want to, in a manner similar to that in which the validity of a truth is entirely independent of whether or not the truth becomes real in any consciousness. — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Thus ontology teaches us two things: (1) If the in-itself were to found itself, it could attempt to do so only by making itself consciousness; that is, the concept of causa sui includes within it that of presence to self—i.e., the nihilating decompression of being; (2) Consciousness is in fact a project of founding itself; that is, of attaining to the dignity of the in-itself-for-itself or in-itself-as-self-cause. But we can not derive anything further from this. Nothing allows us to affirm on the ontological level that the nihilation of the in-itself in for-itself has for its meaning—from the start and at the very heart of the in-itself—the project of being its own self-cause. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1436 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

The story struck me as illogical (which it was), and therefore wrong (which it was not). It took the Holocaust to convince me that the second does not necessarily follow from the first. — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 585 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Moral rules cannot be created or altered by deliberate human enactment — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 443; Moral obligation need not be logical to be valid — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 585; Ontology cannot prove that being’s self-foundation is the meaning of consciousness’ nihilation — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1436 (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• Ontology cannot prove that being’s self-foundation is the meaning of consciousness’ nihilation #exemplifies (0.82) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1436
• Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will #contradicts (0.82) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356
• Moral obligation need not be logical to be valid #qualifies (0.80) — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 585
• Procedural ethics cannot justify principles without empirical accounts of persons #corroborates (0.75) — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, 426
• Moral rules cannot be created or altered by deliberate human enactment #complicates (0.72) — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 443