Duty-based moral cultures suppress cost-sensitivity in prosocial decisions.

Evidence

In one scenario, rural Indian participants were willing to give up even their lives to save a highly valued police commissioner, whereas urban Indians and Americans would accept only a relatively minor cost to themselves to save the commissioner’s life (Sachdeva 2010). Urban Indians and American participants were sensitive to the cost of a moral action, but rural participants were not. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 558

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s Big God / fumi-e analysis: opposing cost-sensitivity is precisely what the Japanese apostasy ritual disrupts — the public, costly act re-introduces cost into moral judgment, wrecking the duty logic the priests rely on. — connects to: Market models explain why moral standards vary across contexts, groups, and individuals. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 400; Duty-based moral systems enforce asymmetric, non-proportional exchange favoring the powerful. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 553; Duty-based moralities subordinate the individual to maintenance of social norms. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 553 (+8 more)
• ADDENDUM: Directly extends ‘On Sacrifice: The Real Kind, with Corpses’ — a duty-culture willingness to lay down one’s life, quantified by urban/rural split, parallels the sacrificial-logic regimes surveyed there.

Related

• Duty-based moralities subordinate the individual to maintenance of social norms. (similarity 0.84)
• Moral obligation to help scales with recipient benefit relative to actor cost. (similarity 0.83)
• Duty-based moral systems enforce asymmetric, non-proportional exchange favoring the powerful. (similarity 0.81)
• Rural agrarian Indians reward self-sacrifice where urban groups do not. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Moral dispositions resist contrary incentives yet people overestimate their behavioral role #complicates (0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 216
• Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will #expands (0.70) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356