Justified distrust can be a moral act and so trust is not inherently moral

Evidence

Someone who sees himself as the object of such expressions of distrust will hardly be disposed to look at himself from the perspective of distrust and seek the cause of it in himself. The distrust remains for him objectively inexplicable, and he therefore attributes it to the person who distrusts him. In so far as he continues the relationship at all, he will respond at first perhaps with explanations, with forbearance, then with caution and finally with distrust himself. He finds himself relieved of moral obligation by the distrust which is brought against him and given the freedom to act in his own interests, or indeed he actually feels the need to revenge himself for this undeserved treatment. And thus he gives distrust additional justification and further nourishment. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 272 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 98; Blind trust in authority can be culpable stupidity rather than virtue; Trust as knowledge cannot be morally required — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 373 (+4 more)

Related

• Being distrusted relieves a person of moral obligation and breeds reciprocal distrust. (similarity 0.90)
• Distrust is a self-reinforcing, self-fulfilling social dynamic. (similarity 0.86)
• Justified distrust is benign and morally acceptable, not a social failing. (similarity 0.83)
• Trust as knowledge cannot be morally required (similarity 0.82)
• In simple societies distrust is itself punished as a breach of law. (similarity 0.82)
• Trust is not reducible to emotion the way joy might be (similarity 0.81)
• Trust grounded in false knowledge cannot be an intrinsic good (similarity 0.81)
• Misplaced trust costs far more than forgone trust, making distrust come more quickly (similarity 0.81)
• Distrust is self-fulfilling and cannot be invalidated by experience (similarity 0.81)
• Moralizing trust often stems from confusing it with trustworthiness (similarity 0.81)
• Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose (similarity 0.80)
• Trust arguments often assume benign societies that may not exist (similarity 0.80)
• Trust can be extended to create an obligation in the trusted (similarity 0.80)
• Excess knowledge that trust is being built can itself collapse it into distrust (similarity 0.80)
• Distrust functions as an equivalent alternative to trust (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Being distrusted relieves a person of moral obligation and breeds reciprocal distrust. #complicates (0.75) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 272
• Distrust is self-fulfilling and cannot be invalidated by experience #complicates (0.72)