Trust as knowledge cannot be morally required

Evidence

To say that something is moral could imply two quite different things: that it is morally required or that it is at least morally a good thing. If trust is a matter of knowledge, then moralizing it seems peculiar in either of these senses. Consider whether it could be required in common contexts. Is it moral or immoral to know or not to know, say, that Afghanistan is ruled by the Taliban? For certain officeholders in the U.S. Department of State it might seem immoral, or at least a failure of professional duty, not to know that it is. Am I immoral, however, if what I know about you is inadequate for me to trust you? Unless you can say, as one might of the State Department official, that I am in the wrong not to know those things about you that attest to your trustworthiness with respect to what is potentially at issue between us, then you cannot say it is morally incumbent on me to trust you. Similarly, to say that it is a virtue to trust is to say that it is a virtue to know that others are trustworthy. This is largely incoherent. It is surely a virtue in many contexts to act as one would if one did trust. It is the behavior or the inclination to such behavior, however, not knowledge, that is a virtue. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 373

Categorization

• DEFINE: Sharpens the parsing of ‘moral’ into ‘morally required’ vs ‘morally good’ and locates where trust-as-knowledge sits relative to each — a definitionally useful distinction.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s integration of Hardin with Luhmann: Hardin’s ‘trust as knowledge’ claim parallels Luhmann’s ‘familiarity’ as a baseline epistemic state, and both treat trust as cognitive rather than moral. — connects to: Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 98; Trust belongs to knowledge, so it cannot be offered, demanded, or withheld; Trust cannot be paired with obligation as promises are (+6 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 373

Broader Connections

• Trust cannot be governed by clear-cut ethical instruction #corroborates (0.85)
• Justified distrust can be a moral act and so trust is not inherently moral #corroborates (0.80)
• Perceived moral obligation does not guarantee trust #corroborates (0.75)