Sympathy is not intrinsically moral because it serves partiality, not impartiality.

Evidence

As Cova, Deonna, & Sander (Cova et al.) observe, if the mutualistic theory is true, then moral emotions should conform to the mutualistic logic of impartiality while others need not do so. This gives us a principled way to contrast moral and non-moral emotions. Consider sympathy (or empathy), mentioned by Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, Gintis, Rochat & Robbins, and Warneken, and often considered moral because of its prosocial character. Of course, sympathy often plays a role in motivating moral behavior. Still, it is not always in line with morality: It may lead us to be partial, for instance when we unduly favor our friends at the expense of others or when, in order to protect those we love, we put others at risk. This suggests that sympathy is not an intrinsically moral emotion; its function is not to cause us to be fair, but to help individuals – friends, spouses, children – whose welfare matters to us. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 660

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes moral from non-moral emotions by the criterion of impartiality — a clean conceptual framework.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s own reading purpose on Father Rodrigues and the Big God mechanism — moral emotion vs. the impartial moral agent. — connects to: Disgust is not moral in itself; causing it unfairly is. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 665; Justified distrust can be a moral act and so trust is not inherently moral; Norms shaped by kin altruism and group solidarity are not necessarily moral norms. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 693 (+3 more)

Related

• Disgust is not moral in itself; causing it unfairly is. (similarity 0.81)
• Mutualistic anthropology explains moral anger as an evolved fairness-restoring mechanism (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Fairness rests on impartiality, not mutualistic cooperation. #corroborates (0.95) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 563
• Justified distrust can be a moral act and so trust is not inherently moral #expands (0.85)
• Disgust is not moral in itself; causing it unfairly is. #expands (0.82) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 665
• Norms shaped by kin altruism and group solidarity are not necessarily moral norms. #expands (0.82) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 693