Misplaced trust costs far more than forgone trust, making distrust come more quickly

Evidence

In a relatively benign society, we can afford to take chances with people in general until we discover any of them not to be worthy of cooperation. If, in contrast, we had come to be distrusting in general, the result in a benign society would surely be far worse than what would follow from taking risks on people. Presumably, it would seem much more akin to much of international relations, as in the Cold War between East and West, in which distrust often seemed to be the baseline and trust to be an unreachable goal. Still, to be generally distrusting—or at least to fail to trust—would not be irrational or immoral in some contexts. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 605 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Generalized distrust in a benign society costs more than misplaced risks — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 605; Distrust requires little evidence while trust demands rich understanding of incentives; Distrust is self-reinforcing because it starves itself of corrective information

Related

• Generalized distrust in a benign society costs more than misplaced risks (similarity 0.94)
• Trust arguments often assume benign societies that may not exist (similarity 0.91)
• Distrust needs less information than trust to form. (similarity 0.87)
• Distrust is self-reinforcing because it selects for untrustworthy partners (similarity 0.85)
• Distrust requires little evidence while trust demands rich understanding of incentives (similarity 0.85)
• Learned distrust is harder to unlearn and blocks success more than learned trust (similarity 0.85)
• Suspicion of others’ trustworthiness is inherently well grounded (similarity 0.84)
• Optimism about others’ trustworthiness is self-reinforcing through gained experience (similarity 0.84)
• Universal trust can be rational in sufficiently benign worlds despite Luhmann (similarity 0.84)
• Justified distrust is benign and morally acceptable, not a social failing. (similarity 0.83)
• Initial trust levels create self-reinforcing spirals of cooperation or distrust (similarity 0.83)
• Failed trust is answered with still more trust, not less. (similarity 0.83)
• Individual-level rational-choice accounts of trust fail as general explanations (similarity 0.83)
• Generalized distrust is more rational than generalized trust. (similarity 0.83)
• Distrust is often the rational default even in good relationships (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Distrust requires little evidence while trust demands rich understanding of incentives #expands (0.85)
• Generalized distrust in a benign society costs more than misplaced risks #corroborates (0.82) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 605
• Distrust is self-reinforcing because it starves itself of corrective information #expands (0.80)