Being distrusted relieves a person of moral obligation and breeds reciprocal distrust.

Evidence

Someone who sees himself as the object of such expressions of distrust will hardly be disposed to look at himself from the perspective of distrust and seek the cause of it in himself. The distrust remains for him objectively inexplicable, and he therefore attributes it to the person who distrusts him. In so far as he continues the relationship at all, he will respond at first perhaps with explanations, with forbearance, then with caution and finally with distrust himself. He finds himself relieved of moral obligation by the distrust which is brought against him and given the freedom to act in his own interests, or indeed he actually feels the need to revenge himself for this undeserved treatment. And thus he gives distrust additional justification and further nourishment. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 272

Categorization

• XREF: A self-reinforcing spiral (distrust begets distrust) that parallels the escalation of resentment Stevens might feel if his system trust were ever turned against him. — connects to: Distrust is a self-reinforcing, self-fulfilling social dynamic.; Distrust functions as an equivalent alternative to trust — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 262; Organizations require the truster to retain a modicum of distrust (+8 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: The claim that distrust granted toward you relieves you of moral obligation and licenses self-interested action is dense and counterintuitive — a feedback loop with ethical weight rivalling anything else here.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 272

Broader Connections

• Punishment, penance and pardon close off occasions for further distrust. #complicates (0.50)
• Distrust functions as an equivalent alternative to trust #exemplifies (0.40) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 262
• Binary schematization makes trust and distrust reversible opposites, easing transition between them. #expands (0.40) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 311
• Trust requires genuine vulnerability and the partner’s real interest in betraying it #corroborates (0.40)
• In simple societies distrust is itself punished as a breach of law. #contradicts (0.40)
• Organizations require the truster to retain a modicum of distrust #qualifies (0.35)
• Excess knowledge that trust is being built can itself collapse it into distrust #complicates (0.35)
• Deviant initiative signals trustworthiness because it assumes and strengthens existing trust #contradicts (0.35)