Trust is not reducible to emotion the way joy might be

Evidence

Trust is in the cognitive category with knowledge and belief. To say I trust you in some way is to say nothing more than that I know or believe certain things about you—generally things about your incentives or other reasons to live up to my trust, to be trustworthy to me. My assessment of your trustworthiness in a particular context is simply my trust of you. The declarations “I believe you are trustworthy” and “I trust you” are equivalent. If it is cognitive, it follows that trust is not purposive (Baier 1986, 235). I do not trust you in order to gain from interacting with you. Rather, because I do trust you, I can expect to gain from interacting with you if a relevant opportunity arises. Moreover, if trust is cognitive, it is not behavioral. I may act from my trust, and my action may give evidence of my trust, but my action is not itself the trust, although it may be compelling evidence of my trust. If I trust you, I trust you right now and not only in some moment in which I act on my trust by taking a risk on you. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 98 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 98; Trust is merely evidence-based expectation while trustworthiness is motivational; Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation (+3 more)

Related

• Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose (similarity 0.93)
• Trust is a three-part cognitive relation grounded in truth, not choice (similarity 0.92)
• Trust is defined by the reason for expectation, not the expectation itself (similarity 0.88)
• Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation (similarity 0.88)
• Trust reduces to knowledge while trustworthiness is motivational (similarity 0.87)
• Infant trust is an evolved instinct, not a cognitive model (similarity 0.87)
• Explaining trust is epistemic, explaining trustworthiness is motivational (similarity 0.87)
• Trust is a degree of expected probability, not a separate decision layered onto risk. (similarity 0.87)
• Trust belongs to belief states, while risk-taking is the separable action. (similarity 0.86)
• Trust is a matter of knowledge and belief, not of choice or action. (similarity 0.86)
• Trust can be extended to create an obligation in the trusted (similarity 0.86)
• Trust is rational expectation about the trusted party’s self-interest (similarity 0.86)
• Primary emotional attachments ground trust that later extends far beyond them (similarity 0.85)
• Trust is not chosen, a gamble, or an investment; only actions are (similarity 0.85)
• Trust is a three-part relation, not an ungrounded attitude of faith (similarity 0.85)

Broader Connections

• Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose #expands (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 98
• Trust is defined by the reason for expectation, not the expectation itself #expands (0.85)
• Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation #expands (0.80)
• Trust is a three-part cognitive relation grounded in truth, not choice #expands (0.80)
• Trust is merely evidence-based expectation while trustworthiness is motivational #complicates (0.75)