Hard-line F.L.N. leaders read the war’s trajectory as favoring continued fighting over compromise.

Evidence

But at the same time the A.L.N.’s losses had been twice that number, and in trained djounoud it could ill spare. Morale among the combatants in some units was shakier than it had perhaps ever been; following the mysterious “liquidation” of Ramdane Abane, the atmosphere in the higher echelons of the C.C.E. was far from happy; inside the country war-weariness, ever latent, showed signs of taking a greater hold as the “exterior” proved increasingly incapable of supplying the “interior” with the arms it so badly needed. There was more talk about a “compromise” peace, and as morale waned within so did enthusiasm among the Muslim “brothers” abroad upon whom the F.L.N. relied for arms and support. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 962 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

But with the hard-liners now well in the ascendant the interpretation the F.L.N. placed on the events of January 1960 was one of the overall weakness of the French position, presaging a total surrender to the maximum F.L.N. terms. With justification the hard-liners could point out that the first four years of fighting had overthrown the Fourth Republic and brought in de Gaulle and electoral franchise for Algerian Muslims; the next year had achieved “self-determination” and, now, the sixth year of the war had begun with Frenchmen firing on Frenchmen — altogether a not unsatisfactory balance. All that was required was to fight on for a few more months, a year or two at most, and de Gaulle would be forced to negotiate — on F.L.N. terms. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1173 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Rejecting the paix des braves is what ultimately let the F.L.N. win; The F.L.N. framed independence as seized, not granted.; Army hard-liners like Boumedienne drove the F.L.N.’s negotiators to intransigence. (+2 more)

Related

• War-weariness and compromise talk spread inside the F.L.N. after 13 May (similarity 0.92)
• Rejecting the paix des braves is what ultimately let the F.L.N. win (similarity 0.91)
• F.L.N. hard-liners believed French weakness made continued fighting the winning strategy (similarity 0.91)
• Army hard-liners like Boumedienne drove the F.L.N.’s negotiators to intransigence. (similarity 0.88)
• Rigid F.L.N. negotiating terms outlasted France’s shifting war aims (similarity 0.87)
• Both F.L.N. and French leaders adopted intransigent rhetoric to placate their army hard-liners (similarity 0.87)
• Army hard-liners under Boumedienne challenged the F.L.N. political leadership (similarity 0.85)
• F.L.N. hardliners pushed tighter population control that moderates feared would ruin negotiation prospects. (similarity 0.85)
• The F.L.N. hard-liners won standing by crediting violence, not soft diplomacy, for concessions. (similarity 0.85)
• The Algerian negotiating camp was deeply split between Boumedienne’s hard-liners and Krim’s politicos. (similarity 0.85)
• Post-independence leadership rivalries turned lethal within the F.L.N. (similarity 0.84)
• de Gaulle’s backing of moderates collapsed as hard-liners took over the F.L.N. (similarity 0.84)
• F.L.N. hard-liners treated negotiations as stalling devices to gain time. (similarity 0.83)
• F.L.N. power struggles intensified as independence approached. (similarity 0.83)
• The F.L.N.’s deep historical mistrust of France drove its intransigent negotiating posture. (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• War-weariness and compromise talk spread inside the F.L.N. after 13 May #contradicts (0.80) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 962
• F.L.N. hard-liners believed French weakness made continued fighting the winning strategy #expands (0.75) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1173